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INTRODUCTION
How does distributive justice - for short, "equity" - bear on the
regulation of health and safety risks? And what are the analytical tools that
risk regulators should use to incorporate equity concerns into their decision-
making? This Article proposes an answer to these vital questions which is
novel, but also firmly grounded in the social-welfare-function tradition in
welfare economics. The distributive impacts of risk regulation policies
should be evaluated with reference to a social welfare function, with the
status quo and each possible policy conceptualized as a probability distribu-
tion across population profiles consisting of lifetime income-health-longev-
ity histories for each member of the population.
No clear paradigm for equity analysis has yet emerged in governmental
practice. The contrast with risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis is stark.
Highly sophisticated procedures for risk assessment and cost-benefit analy-
sis currently exist. These procedures are employed by regulators, carefully
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monitored by oversight bodies, and supported by large bodies of scholarly
work.' Equity analysis, on the other hand, is inchoate and haphazard. Exec-
utive Order 12,866, the chief legal instrument governing agency policy anal-
ysis, states that agency regulations should maximize net benefits and then
proceeds to explain that benefits include "distributive impacts" and "eq-
uity."2 But the net-benefits-maximization test of traditional cost-benefit
analysis is insensitive to distributional considerations. Executive Order
12,866 provides no guidance about the meaning of "distributive impacts"
and "equity," nor about how these considerations should be incorporated
into cost-benefit analysis. The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB")
guidance document regarding compliance with Executive Order 12,866 is
lengthy and, on many issues, quite specific. When it comes to distributive
analysis, however, the OMB guidance is brief and vague.'
Equity considerations are more specifically discussed by a different
presidential directive. Executive Order 12,898, the Environmental Justice
order, states that: "[t]o the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law,
... each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of
its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately
high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs,
policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations
in the United States."4 This order adopts a particular conception of risk eq-
uity: namely, a social-gradient conception of equity, which sees an inequita-
ble policy as one whose impacts on socially disadvantaged groups are less
favorable than its impacts on socially advantaged groups. Further, Execu-
tive Order 12,898 is quite specific in identifying low-income and minority
status as the relevant markers of social disadvantage.5
However, techniques for implementing an environmental justice/social
gradient conception of risk equity in agency decisionmaking remain unset-
tled. The scholarly literature on environmental justice, which is now quite
substantial, has focused on testing factual hypotheses about whether waste
dumps, hazardous waste processors, sources of air pollution, or other risk
For citations to the scholarly literature on risk assessment, and to descriptions of the use
of risk assessment by governmental bodies, see Matthew D. Adler, Against "'Individual Risk":
A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1128-29 nn.28-29
(2005) [hereinafter Adler, Against "Individual Risk"]. On cost-benefit scholarship, see, for
example, A. MYRICK FREEMAN 111. THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE
VALUES (2d ed. 2003). On the use of cost-benefit analysis in the federal government, see
generally MATrHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 1-4, 101-23 (2006), and sources cited therein.
2 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). The recent
amendments to Executive Order 12,866, by Executive Order 13,422, do not change the sub-
stantive requirements imposed on agency rules by Executive Order 12,866 and, in particular,
do not change its content regarding "distributive impacts" and "equity." Exec. Order. No.
13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007).
'See Circular A-4, Off. Mgmt. & Budget (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.white
house.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.
Exec. Order No. 12,898 § 1-101, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
5 1d.
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sources tend to be located in minority or low-income areas, and whether
such skews are caused by racial or socioeconomic bias.6 Less work has been
done creating tools to measure the degree of inequality between members of
advantaged and disadvantaged groups with respect to the effects of health
and safety hazards, and for measuring the equity impact of policies that miti-
gate these hazards.7 EPA, the largest of the federal agencies that regulate
health and safety risks, and generally the most advanced in the development
of policy tools, has given some attention to implementing environmental jus-
tice. There is an environmental justice office within EPA, and a number of
guidance documents and letters have been issued.' Yet environmental jus-
tice analysis still plays a very small role within EPA decisionmaking - as
compared to cost-benefit analysis, let alone risk assessment, which is perva-
sive.9 Nor has the agency resolved upon a set of concrete procedures and
metrics for structuring the analysis.'0
6 A number of these empirical studies are cited in William Bowen, An Analytical Review
of Environmental Justice Research: What Do We Really Know?, 29 ENVTL. MGMT. 3, 13-15
(2002) and in Evan J. Ringquist, Assessing Evidence of Environmental Inequities: A Meta-
Analysis, 24 J. POL'Y ANAL. & MGMT. 223, 245-47 (2005). Other scholarship about environ-
mental justice is cited or excerpted in CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRON-
MENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY, AND REGULATION (2002); Sheila R. Foster, Meeting the
Environmental Justice Challenge: Evolving Norms in Environmental Decisionmaking, 30
ENVTL L. REP. 10992 (2000); and Robert Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30
ENVTL. L. REP. 10681 (2000).
' On environmental justice tools, see, for example, EPA, SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD: RE-
VIEW OF DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT METHODOLOGIES (1998); FENG Liu, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE ANALYSIS: THEORIES, METHODS, AND PRACTICE (2001); TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH
BOARD OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, EFFECTIVE METHODS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ASSESS-
MENT (2004). As discussed below, there are close parallels between the environmental justice
and health equity literatures, see infra text accompanying notes 15-19; and that latter literature
has developed a variety of metrics for quantifying social skews in health. See, e.g., Johan P.
Mackenbach & Anton E. Kunst, Measuring the Magnitude of Socio-economic Inequalities in
Health: An Overview of Available Measures Illustrated with Two Examples from Europe, 44
Soc. ScI. MED. 757 (1997).
' For a critical review of environmental justice policy at EPA, see EPA, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, EPA NEEDS TO CONSISTENTLY IMPLEMENT THE INTENT OF THE EXECU-
TIVE ORDER ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, REPORT No. 2004-P-00007 (2004). See also Rich-
ard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice into EPA Permitting
Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 617 (1999); Bradford C. Mank, The Draft Title VI Recipient and
Revised Investigation Guidances: Too Much Discretion for EPA and a More Difficult Standard
for Complaints?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11144 (2000) [hereinafter Mank, The Draft Title VI Re-
cipient]: Bradford C. Mank, Executive Order 12,898, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUS-
TICE 107-14, 125-29 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999) [hereinafter Mank, Executive Order
12,898]. On environmental justice policy at other federal agencies, see Denis Binder et al., A
Survey of Federal Agency Response to President Clinton's Executive Order No. 12898 on
Environmental Justice, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11133 (2001); Mank, Executive Order 12,898,
supra, at 114-23, 129-31.
9 On risk assessment at EPA, see, e.g., Adler, Against "Individual Risk, " supra note 1, at
1149-64; id. at 1148 n.91 (citing sources). On cost-benefit analysis, see, for example, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997).
"o See EPA, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 8, at 19-26 (discussing differ-
ing approaches to identifying disparate impacts on low-income and minonty communities em-
ployed by EPA regional offices and EPA's failure to establish a single approach). EPA's
guidance on incorporating distributional concerns into cost-benefit analysis is lengthier than
OMB's in Circular A-4, see supra note 3; but it still fails to recommend specific policy metrics
20081
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Academic scholarship about risk equity has also failed to advance very
far. An important exception, already mentioned, is the literature on environ-
mental justice. The social-gradient model, developed in that literature, does
provide a relatively clear conception of distributive justice. However, as I
shall argue below, the conception is a problematic one. Relatively little aca-
demic work has been done to develop and make workable competing con-
ceptions of risk equity. At least in the United States, neither economists nor
the toxicologists and other scholars who write about risk assessment have
done so to any substantial degree.
Health economists abroad, particularly in Britain, have discussed the
possible use of equity weights in QALY-based policy analysis." This work
has had no influence on U.S. governmental bodies, and appears to have had
little influence on academic economists in the United States. Economists in
this country have done some work quantifying the "incidence" of the costs
of environmental policies on different groups, and have also written about
the possible use of "distributional weights" within cost-benefit analysis. 2
But the volume of economic writing on these equity matters is fairly small
compared to the vast U.S. literature on cost-benefit analysis. Finally, some
scholarship within risk assessment does address equity issues, in particular
suggesting that regulatory attention to "individual risk" rather than popula-
tion risk (total deaths) is required by equity.'3 However, scholarship of this
sort represents a small fraction of the corpus of work produced by risk as-
sessment scholars, and has not succeeded in producing an influential concep-
tion of equity.
The inattention to risk equity by U.S. economists may reflect the old
and still lingering view that welfare economics becomes subjective and inap-
propriately value-laden once it goes beyond endorsing Pareto-efficiency.
The risk assessors' inattention may reflect their self-understanding as scien-
tists who make no normative claims whatsoever. Whatever the cause, risk
equity as a topic of scholarly discourse remains something of a vacuum.
This Article is intended to help fill that vacuum by advancing a new
conception of risk equity. I suggest that health and safety agencies might
evaluate the equity impacts of their policies by applying a variety of plausi-
ble utility functions and equity-regarding social welfare functions
("SWFs"), with the recognition that health, longevity and income are all
important determinants of individual well-being, and the understanding that
both the status quo and any given policy have an uncertain effect on individ-
uals' longevity, health, and income. The status quo should be understood as
a probability distribution across population profiles, each consisting of a life-
time health and income history for each member of the population. A policy
for quantifying the degree of distributional skew or balancing distributive concerns with effi-
ciency/overall welfare. See EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMic ANALYSES 139-74
(2000).
"See infra Part I.C.
'
2 See infra Parts I.D, I.F.
"See infra Part I.B.
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would perturb this distribution and lead to a different set of probabilities for
possible profiles. A utility function assigns a lifetime utility to each individ-
ual's longevity-health-income history. With this utility function in hand, the
equity analyst can convert each population profile of individual longevity-
health-income histories into a population profile of individual lifetime utili-
ties. The status quo, and each policy, become probabilistic packages of pop-
ulation utility profiles. Plausible SWFs are then applied to these packages.
I will call this conception of risk-equity analysis "probabilistic popula-
tion profile analysis" ("PPPA"). This conception is firmly grounded in the
notion of an SWF: a construct that has been developed within a branch of
welfare economics which is comfortable making normative claims about eq-
uity, and that has been mainly applied to questions of optimal tax policy.
The contribution of this Article is to explain how the SWF notion might be
operationalized in the domain of risk regulation, through PPPA, and to de-
fend that approach as feasible (at least in the foreseeable future) and norma-
tively attractive.
Part I of the Article criticizes existing approaches to risk equity: the
environmental-justice or social-gradient paradigm; the notion that equity
concerns the distribution of individual risks; QALY-based analysis with eq-
uity weights; incidence analysis; "inclusive" equality measurement; and
cost-benefit analysis with distributional weights.
Part II defends the PPPA approach. I summarize the notion of an eq-
uity-regarding SWF, which grounds the approach. I then describe PPPA in
detail and argue that the approach is foreseeably, if not immediately, feasi-
ble. Techniques would need to be developed to predict the impact of poli-
cies on each individual's lifetime "holdings" of both income and health/
longevity. However, such techniques represent an incremental, not radical,
extension of existing risk assessment and incidence analysis methodologies.
Optimal tax scholarship has already provided a range of plausible SWFs. In
particular, PPPA should rely on the so-called Atkinsonian family of SWFs,
as well as the rank-weighted SWF, in analyzing risk policies.
Existing scholarly literatures do not contain the information needed to
calibrate the utility function that would map individuals' longevity-health-
income histories onto utility numbers - the utility numbers that are the
arguments for the SWF. This gap can and should be filled through survey
research. Until such research takes place, one possibility is to ignore health
as a component of utility, and to employ the "constant relative risk aver-
sion" utility function to attach utilities to life histories (now understood as
lifetime income sequences). The constant relative risk aversion functional
form has been extensively studied by economists, and estimates of the coef-
ficient of relative risk aversion are available. Another possibility is to as-
sume that lifetime utility as a function of health and income is additive
across periods and multiplicative within periods, i.e., takes the form of
T
q( hi,)v ,,,),
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where h,, is individual i's health in period t, Yi., is her income in period t, and
q(h,.,) and v(yj,,) are "subutility" functions measuring the value of health and
income, respectively, in each period. 14 It could then be assumed that v(yi,)
takes the constant relative risk aversion form. Existing data about individual
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for health could be used to esti-
mate the within-period health function q(h,.,).
PPPA represents a social-welfare-function approach to equity analysis
that is quite general and can extend beyond risk regulation - for example,
to estimate the equity impacts of tax-and-transfer policies, or of spending to
fund public goods. But decision-cost and measurement considerations mean
that the general approach will be developed differently in different areas.
For example, in the case of a policy that funds or defunds national parks, it
would be crucial to include individuals' recreational activities as a determi-
nant of their utilities. In the case of risk regulation, where the main effects
on individual well-being occur via changes in health, longevity, and income,
recreational activities as an input to individual utility, and therewith the
SWF, can (plausibly) be ignored. The Article therefore focuses on risk regu-
lation and risk equity, elaborating the application of a social-welfare-func-
tion approach to that particular policy domain in the form of PPPA.
I. EXISTING APPROACHES TO RISK EQUITY
A. Environmental Justice
Executive Order 12,898, as well as much of the scholarly writing under
the heading of environmental justice, adopts a social-gradient conception of
risk equity.'5 A policy implicates environmental justice insofar as it has a
disproportionately negative impact on certain socially disadvantaged groups.
The policy (1) imposes costs on at least some group members; and (2) those
costs are disproportionately larger than the costs it imposes on non-
members. 16
14 For non-economists, what this formula means is that we assign the individual's health
state and income state in each period a value. We next multiply these two numbers, arriving at
a total value for each period. These period values are then summed to determine lifetime
utility.
"- On this conception within the environmental justice literature, see, e.g., Kuehn, supra
note 6, at 10683-84. The recent EPA Inspector General report claims that EPA itself is resis-
tant to the social-gradient conception of risk equity. See EPA, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN-
ERAL, supra note 8, at 10-11. EPA, however, has officially adopted this conception in various
documents. See, e.g., EPA, EPA GUIDANCE FOR CONSIDERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
IN CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION 309 REVIEWS (1999); Mank, The Draft Title VI Recipient, supra
note 8, at §1.3.
'6 Scott Farrow has proposed a related approach to equity - namely that a policy not only
pass the test of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, but that actual compensation be provided to members
of a "sensitive group," such as low-income or minority groups. Scott Farrow, Environmental
Equity and Sustainability: Rejecting the Kaldor-Hicks Criteria, 27 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 183,
185-86 (1998). This proposal, like the disparate-impact tests considered in the text, is vulnera-
[Vol. 32
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In focusing on disadvantaged groups and disparate impact, this social-
gradient conception of risk equity is similar to the view that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the U.S. Constitution proscribes laws that have a disparate
impact on racial minorities - a view which the Supreme Court has not
incorporated into its justiciable doctrines enforcing that Clause, 7 but is ar-
guably reflected in employment discrimination statutes." The social-gradi-
ent conception is also adopted in much of the literature on health equity. 19
Environmental justice scholars typically focus their attention on toxic
hazards or environmental disamenities, while the health equity literature typ-
ically concerns social skews in health generally or in health care. But these
two literatures share, as their basic normative concern, the principle that
members of socially disadvantaged groups ought not to fare especially badly
with respect to health or longevity.
A fundamental difficulty with the environmental justice/social gradient
approach is that it overlooks inequalities among individuals who are not
members of the groups counted as socially disadvantaged. Consider the
framework of Executive Order 12,898, which enjoins agencies to address
disproportionately high health effects on minority populations and low-in-
come populations. Under this framework, the distribution of health and lon-
gevity among non-impoverished white individuals - those who fall into
neither of the two categories highlighted by the Executive Order - is not
seen as an equity concern.
For example, a deregulatory policy that raises air pollutant levels might
increase death and morbidity among individuals with respiratory diseases,
including some individuals who are neither racial minorities nor have low
incomes. Another example: permitting a dangerous product might cause
some children to die, including some non-impoverished white children.
These look like potential inequities, simply by virtue of the impact of the
policies within the subpopulation of non-impoverished white individuals,
and quite apart from their effect on poor individuals or racial minorities.
ble to the objection that it ignores inequalities among individuals who do not belong to the
"sensitive group."
7 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
"8 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k) (2006). 1 say "arguably" because it is plausible (al-
though certainly not uncontroversial) to take the view that federal prohibitions on practices
with a disparate impact are grounded in Congress's power to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 494-95 & n.4 (2003).
"9 See, e.g., Sudhir Anand, The Concern for Equity in Health, in PUBLIC HEALTH, ETHICS,
AND EQUITY 15, 19-20 (Sudhir Anand et al. eds., 2004); Paula Braveman. Health Disparities
and Health Equity: Concepts and Measurement, 27 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 167, 169-70
(2006); C.J.L. Murray et al., Health Inequalities and Social Group Differences: What Should
We Measure?. 77 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 537, 537-38 (1999); Adam Wagstaff & Eddy
van Doorslaer, Overall Versus Socioeconomic Health Inequality: A Measurement Framework
and Two Empirical Illustrations, 13 HEALTH ECON. 297, 297 (2004); WHO Task Force on
Research Priorities for Equity in Health & The WHO Equity Team, Priorities for Research to
Take Forward the Health Equity Policy Agenda, 83 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 948, 948
(2005).
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 7 2008
Harvard Environmental Law Review
This is not to say that a policy's impact on poor individuals or racial
minorities is not an equity concern. Of course it is. It is rather to say that
there is an additional equity concern in these examples, which Executive
Order 12,898 - framed in terms of disparate impact on minority and low-
income groups - does not capture. In the pollution example, some non-
impoverished whites have the further advantage of good health; others in
this group do benefit from being white and having adequate incomes, but
have the misfortune to suffer chronic diseases. The gap between their well-
being and that of their luckier counterparts is increased by the deregulatory
policy. Similarly, in the dangerous product example, some non-impover-
ished whites have the further advantage of living a full lifespan while others
suffer the misfortune of premature death. Permitting the dangerous product
has the effect of expanding the size of this unfortunate group.
The objection might be framed as follows. There are various measura-
ble dimensions of well-being, from D, to DK. The benefit of being white in a
society with a history of oppression of non-whites is one such "dimension."
So is income. So is health. So is longevity. The disparate-impact analysis
set forth by Executive Order 12,898 focuses on a subset of these dimensions,
DI to Dj, where J<K. That analysis takes a dimension D, within the subset
and asks whether a hazard increases skews in well-being or aspects of well-
being between those who are at a high level with respect to D, and those who
are at a low level. What this approach ignores are inequalities among those
individuals who are all at a reasonably high level for each D, with i <J, but
some of whom are at a low level for some D, with i > J.
The environmental justice theorist has two possible responses to this
objection. The first is to expand the set of dimensions along which policy
skews are measured. We might say that a policy triggers environmental jus-
tice concerns if it has a disparate impact on racial minorities, low-income
groups, or women, disabled individuals, those in poor health, children, or the
aged. Indeed, some of the scholarly literature pushes in this direction.20 The
problem here is how to aggregate a policy's equity effects along these multi-
ple dimensions to arrive at an overall equity evaluation of the project. Imag-
ine that we have some measure, S, of disparate impact. (The existing
literature on health equity offers a variety of proposals as to what S might
be.)2' A policy might have a high S score with respect to Dl, a low S score
with respect to D2, and so forth. That is to say, it might impose costs on
individuals with low D1 levels that tend to be much greater, in absolute or
proportional terms, than its costs for individuals with higher DI levels; but
also impose costs on individuals with low D 2 levels that tend to be the same
or even lower (in absolute or proportional terms) than its costs for individu-
als with higher D2 levels. The policy has a highly disparate impact along the
20 See Liu, supra note 7, at 95-96; TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, supra note 7, at
19. 21 See supra sources cited in note 7.
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D, axis, but a zero or reverse disparate impact along the D2 axis - and so
forth for axes D3 through DK.
If all the measurable dimensions of well-being are included as potential
axes for disparate impact, the straightforward answer to this inter-axis aggre-
gation problem is to move away from dimension-specific disparate-impact
measures to a single population-wide measure of inequality. Since a skew in
well-being or aspects of well-being between those at a low and those at a
high level with respect to any one of the D, raises a distributive concern, why
not ask how each individual fares, all things considered, as a consequence of
her various attainments along the various dimensions DI through DK; and
then apply some metric of inequality to the population distribution of these
overall attainments? The environmental-justice approach thereby morphs
into the PPPA approach.
But the environmental justice theorist need not be led down this path.
Instead, she might insist that the attributes highlighted by Executive Order
12,898 are distinctive. Being a racial minority, or lacking an adequate in-
come, are not merely determinants of well-being. These characteristics are
socially salient and have a particular social function that renders them
uniquely important as a matter of distributive justice. As Paula Braveman, a
leading health-equity scholar, and a co-author explain:
[e]quity in health . . . [is] the absence of systematic disparities in
health ... between social groups who have different levels of so-
cial advantage/disadvantage - that is, different positions in a so-
cial hierarchy.
Underlying social advantage or disadvantage refers to wealth,
power, and/or prestige - that is, the attributes that define how
people are grouped in social hierarchies. 2
Being black or low-income is socially disadvantaging; these characteristics
lower social status. And, in Braveman's view, it is health disparities between
high-social-status and lower-social-status individuals that health-equity mea-
sures should seek to capture.23
Perhaps the fullest elaboration and defense of this view is provided by
the philosopher Iris Marion Young. She argues that "claims about social
justice that invoke equality usually require comparison of groups on mea-
sures of well-being or advantage .... Assessment of inequality in terms of
the comparison of individuals yields little basis for judging injustice. 24
Young's argument rests on two premises about the connection between dis-
tributive justice and inequality. The first is that unjust inequalities involve
22 Paula Braveman & Sofia Gruskin. Defining Equity in Health, 57 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY &
CMTY. HEALTH 254, 254 (2003) (emphasis removed). For a similar analysis, see Braveman,
supra note 19, at 180-82.
23 See Braveman & Gruskin, supra note 22, at 256; Braveman, supra note 19, at 180-88.
24 Iris Marion Young, Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice, 9 J.
POL. PHIL. 1, 7 (2001).
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an absence of choice and responsibility on the part of the worse-off individu-
als. "If the causes of an inequality lie in the uncoerced and considered deci-
sions and preferences of the less well-off persons, for example, then the
inequality is probably not unjust."25 The second premise is that inequalities
which are not socially caused are also not unjust, or at least not as seriously
unjust as socially caused inequalities. "To the extent that injustices are so-
cially caused .... [the correct] conception of justice claims that democratic
political communities are responsible collectively for remedying such ine-
qualities, perhaps more than they are obliged to remedy the effects of so-
called 'brute luck.' 26 These two premises lead Young to conclude that an
inequality must be a "structural inequality" - a difference in well-being or
advantage as a result of social hierarchy - to be a central concern of distrib-
utive justice. Such differences are, clearly, both socially caused and not the
responsibility of the low-status individuals.
Structural inequality . . . consists in the relative constraints
some people encounter in their freedom and material well-being as
the cumulative effect of the possibilities of their social positions,
as compared with others who in their social positions have more
options or easier access to benefits .... Unlike the individualized
attributes of native ability that often concern equality theorists....
structural inequalities are socially caused.27
Further, "individuals alone are not responsible for the way they are enabled
or constrained by structural relations."28
On the issue of individual choice and responsibility, Young's analysis
involves a non sequitur. The fact that some individuals are worse off than
others by virtue of differing ranks in the social hierarchy is a sufficient con-
dition for the worse-off individuals to lack responsibility for the inequality.
But it is not a necessary condition. Individuals who have a high place in the
social hierarchy - they are white, male, and have decent incomes - can
surely suffer "brute luck" with respect to other determinants of well-being,
for example by ingesting a toxin or being thrown from an automobile, and
end up worse off than others through no fault of their own.29
25 Id. at 8.
26 Id. at 16.
27 Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted).
21 Id. at 16.
29 Much of the recent philosophical literature on equality has tried to articulate a concep-
tion of equality that is sensitive to individual responsibility - a concern triggered by Ronald
Dworkin's famous work on equality of resources, which distinguishes between "brute luck"
and "option luck." See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Welfare Should be the Currency of Justice,
30 CAN. J. PHIL. 497 (2000) (citing Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of
Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 189 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equal-
ity of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part
3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1987)).
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The second aspect of Young's argument, one I cannot fully address
here, involves the distinction between social and nonsocial causation.30 If an
asteroid containing extraterrestrial carcinogens strikes Missouri without
warning, then the inequality between those Missourians who incur cancer as
a result of the asteroid, and healthy residents of Missouri or the other forty-
nine states, is not (it would seem) socially caused. Does that mean that
society has no moral obligation to redress the inequality? Imagine that the
bark of a rare tree turns out to be uniquely effective in combating the extra-
terrestrial toxins, and is also effective for some widespread, nonserious
symptom (an annoying rash). Is the choice of how to use the bark simply a
matter of overall well-being or efficiency?
A plausible answer is no. One might agree that (1) morally significant
inequality involves an absence of responsibility on the part of the affected
individuals; and that (2) the moral obligation to redress such inequality falls
on governmental bodies and other powerful actors, rather than individuals
who are powerless to redress it ("ought implies can"); without accepting the
further proposition that (3) governmental bodies and other powerful actors
lack a moral obligation to redress inequalities that are not socially caused. A
different response to Young's argument is to accept this last proposition -
to accept the moral importance of social causation - but also insist that
social causation is present for most of the health and safety impacts that risk
regulators address, even if it is not for the Missouri asteroid. For example,
deaths to high-status individuals because of chemical toxins in a waste dump
are not caused by the social hierarchy, or by the individuals' position in it,
but these deaths are partly caused by a legal regime (a kind of social prod-
uct) that permitted the establishment of the dump in the first place.
In sum, the environmental justice/social gradient account of risk equity
is surely correct to insist that differences in well-being flowing from differ-
ences in social position are a major concern of distributive justice. Where
the account goes awry is in suggesting that these differences are the sole
concern of distributive justice. Differences between individuals who have
the same social status can also be unfair - for example, differences in
health or longevity among equal-status individuals. Environmental justice is
therefore an incomplete conception of risk equity.
B. "Individual Risk" Thresholds and Distributions
An "individual risk" test measures the risk of fatality, disease, or injury
imposed on some specified person by a hazard. Such tests are a key compo-
nent of the regulation of carcinogens and radiation by U.S. agencies.3 For
example, EPA's criteria for mitigating the risks of abandoned waste sites
30 See, e.g., Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?, in THE IDEAL oF EQUALITY 81, 95-97
(Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2000) (discussing egalitarian views that do not
object to natural inequality).
-' See Adler, Against "Individual Risk," supra note 1. at 1149-79.
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require that a clean-up occur if the incremental lifetime cancer risk to the
person maximally at risk from a site exceeds 1 in 10,000, and that any clean-
up bring that risk to within the range of I in 10,000 to 1 in I million.3 2 FDA
regulates carcinogens in food additives by refusing to license an additive
which imposes an incremental lifetime cancer risk on the person consuming
a large amount of the additive (specifically, the 90"h percentile consumer)
exceeding I in 1 million.33 The Clean Air Act requires that EPA set pollu-
tion levels for carcinogenic pollutants by first using a technology-based ap-
proach and then considering a lower level if the incremental lifetime cancer
risk to the maximally exposed individual exceeds 1 in 1 million.34 OSHA
will not intervene to reduce the levels of a toxin currently present in the
workplace unless the incremental lifetime cancer risk to a worker exposed to
the toxin for his entire working life exceeds (or at least is not too far below)
I in 1,000. 31 One of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's principal safety
goals for structuring the licensure and regulation of nuclear plants has been
that individuals living close to plants not incur an annual risk of dying in a
reactor accident that exceeds 1 in 2 million.36 Many similar examples could
be provided.
Risk assessment scholars sometimes suggest that regulatory attention to
"individual risk" levels is justified by equity considerations.37 The current
regime, as just described, typically incorporates "individual risk" thresh-
olds. These require or preclude regulation, or require further regulatory de-
liberation, depending on whether the "individual risk" of some person in the
exposure distribution is above or below a numerical cut-off such as 1 in
1,000, 1 in 10,000, or 1 in 1 million. A different sort of regime might at-
tempt to equalize "individual risk" levels. We might characterize the distri-
bution of individual fatality risks imposed by a toxic hazard, and apply an
inequality metric to that distribution. A large literature in economics seeks
to measure the inequality of income, using metrics such as the Gini coeffi-
cient, the coefficient of variation, the Theil index, or the Atkinson index.38 A
"distributional" variant of the "individual risk" conception of risk equity
32 See id. at 1155-58.
" More precisely. FDA takes this approach for carcinogens exempt from the Delaney
Clause. See id. at 1164-69.
3 4 See id. at 1150-52.
5 See id. at 1169-71.
36 See id. at 1173-78.
" See, e.g., Adam M. Finkel, Comparing Risks Thoughtfully, 7 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY &
ENV'T 325, 342-44 (1996): John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress,
in RISKs, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 183, 190-91 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996). See also Mat-
thew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1423-31 (2003) (discussing environmental-justice account that attends to
skews with respect to "individual risk" levels).
38 For overviews of the literature on measuring the inequality of income, see HLDE BOJER,
DISTRIBUTIONAL JUSTICE: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 63-134 (2003); PETER LAMBERT, THE
DISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 13-132 (3d ed. 2001); AMARTYA SEN, ON Eco-
NOMIC INEQUALITY 24-46 (expanded ed. 1997); F.A. Cowell, Measurement of Inequality, in I
HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 87 (A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon eds., 2000). As I
explain in Part H of the Article, my position is that risk regulation policies should be evaluated
[Vol. 32
HeinOnline  -- 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 12 2008
Adler, Risk Equity: A New Proposal
could apply some such inequality metric to the distribution of "individual
risk."3 9
There are serious difficulties with the "individual risk" conception of
risk equity, whether in the threshold form or in the distributional form. To
begin, the "individual risk" levels that currently figure in regulatory deci-
sionmaking are incremental fatality risks.40 EPA, in cleaning up waste
dumps, is concerned with the risk to nearby residents of dying as a result of
carcinogens in the dump. FDA, in licensing toxic food additives, is con-
cerned with the risk to consumers of dying as a result of carcinogens in their
food. The incremental fatality risk to person P from toxins of type X during
period T (a year, a lifetime) is the probability that X-type toxins cause P's
death during T- or some such construct.4' X-type toxins could be all toxins
in a particular dump, air pollutants from a particular industrial category, a
particular food additive or additives generally, and so forth.
Incremental fatality risks are the wrong currency for risk equity. This is
true whether or not the appropriate time-slice for distributive justice is a
whole lifetime or a temporal fraction of a lifetime. My own view is a whole-
lifetime view, and that view will provide part of the philosophical founda-
tion for PPPA.42 On the whole-lifetime view, the difficulty with incremental
fatality risk tests is that P's incremental risk from X-type toxins during any
period, even a whole lifetime, may have very little connection to P's total
lifetime risk package. For example, the individual maximally exposed to a
with reference to an Atkinsonian social welfare function, which can in turn be decomposed
into an Atkinsonian measure of inequality and overall welfare. See infra Part I.C.
3' Shortly before publication of this Article, I became aware of empirical work by
Jonathan Levy and collaborators that does precisely this. See Jonathan I. Levy et al., Quanti-
fying the Efficiency and Equity Implications of Power Plant Air Pollution Control Strategies in
the United States, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 743 (2007). The approach (which the authors
see as applicable to health as well as mortality risks) is also described in Jonathan I. Levy et
al., Incorporating Concepts of Inequality and Inequity into Health Benefits Analysis, 5 INT'L J.
EQUITY IN HEALTH 2 (2006). Although I argue for a different approach here, Levy and his
collaborators are to be commended for analyzing the equity implications of air pollution poli-
cies in a rigorous and novel way, focusing on population-wide inequality rather than social
gradients, and applying inequality metrics developed in the income-inequality literature to risk
regulation.
40 See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 7, 25-31 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) (criti-
cizing conception of risk equity that focuses on incremental risk).
41 There are different ways to define the incremental fatality risk to person P from toxins
of type X during period T: (1) the risk that X-type toxins cause P's death during T; (2) the
difference in the risk that P dies during T, conditional on his exposure to X-type toxins, and the
risk that P dies during T, conditional on non-exposure; and (3) the difference in the risk that P
dies in the manner characteristic of deaths caused by X-type toxins (e.g., dies from cancer),
conditional on his exposure to X-type toxins, and the risk that P dies in that manner conditional
on non-exposure. If T is less than a full lifetime, all three definitions are possibilities. If T is a
full lifetime, the first and third are. My critique of an approach to risk equity that focuses on
incremental fatality risks does not depend on which precise definition of incremental risk is
adopted.
42 See Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being, Inequality, and Time: The Time-Slice Problem and
its Policy Implications (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 07-17, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1006871; see also infra text accompanying note 82.
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dump, a particular kind of air pollution, a food additive, a radiation source,
or a workplace carcinogen may have a low lifetime risk of dying from can-
cer or a high life expectancy, even though his incremental risk from the
dump, air pollution, etc. is above a stipulated threshold or higher than the
incremental risks imposed on others in the population.
But even if we shift to a sublifetime account of distributive justice -
for example, a view which tries to equalize how individuals fare during each
year - there clearly can be slippage between an individual's total risk pack-
age during the sublifetime and his incremental sublifetime fatality risk from
a particular source. P's risk of dying during a given year could be low even
though his risk of dying during the year as a result of exposure to X-type
toxins is above a stipulated threshold, or high relative to the risk of dying
from X-type toxins suffered by the rest of the population.
This problematic, incrementalist feature of the "individual risk" con-
ception of equity could be cured by construing the category of X-type toxins
very expansively, to encompass all carcinogens or all toxins to which indi-
viduals might be exposed from any source (rather than toxins in a given
dump, air pollution from a particular industrial category, a particular food
additive, or a particular workplace toxin). "Individual risk," thus construed,
would come closer to focusing on an individual's total sublifetime or lifetime
risk package. But two difficulties would remain with the "individual risk"
approach.
First, "individual risks" are fatality risks. They ignore other important
and measurable components of individual well-being, in particular income
and health. Consider a test for risk equity which looks at how a policy inter-
vention changes the distribution of life expectancy or the distribution of the
chance of dying within the coming year, within the population generally or
in particular age cohorts. These approaches are appropriately holistic rather
than incremental with respect to the sources of fatality. Yet they remain
problematic in presupposing that an individual's redistributive claim is just a
function of his longevity. Individuals with chronic non-fatal diseases, or low
but above-subsistence incomes, can have comparatively high life expectan-
cies or low probabilities of dying in the next year, but poor prospects for
annual or lifetime well-being, all things considered. An overweight and
physically inactive high-income white male in his 50s can have a relatively
short life expectancy but relatively high expected lifetime well-being.
Second, a conception of equity that focuses on the "individual risk" of
fatality from particular sources, or overall, adopts an ex ante rather than ex
post approach to equity. Chris Sanchirico and I have argued at length else-
where for an ex post conception of egalitarianism under uncertainty. 43 The
basic idea is this; given some component Z of individual well-being or ad-
vantage (which might be income, health, longevity, or utility as a function of
all three), plus some measure M of equality, plus uncertainty about individ-
" See Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico. Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory
and Legal Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 279 (2006).
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ual attainments with respect to Z, we might (1) apply M to individual expec-
tations with respect to Z; or instead (2) determine the expectation of M,
applied to individuals' actual attainments with respect to Z. Formally, if Zi is
a random variable representing the attainment of individual i with respect to
Z, and there are N individuals, and E(.) is the expected value, we might (1)
calculate M(E(Z1), E(Z 2) .. E(ZN)) or instead (2) calculate E(M(Z.Z 2, ...
, ZN)). The first approach is the ex ante approach, while the second is the ex
post approach.
To see how the "individual risk" approach to equity involves an ex ante
conception of equality under uncertainty, and to understand how this diffi-
culty is distinct from the problem of incrementalism versus holism, let us
consider an appropriately holistic version of the "individual risk" approach
- for example, measuring the distribution of the chance of dying within the
coming year within an age cohort."a Z is then an indicator variable which
takes the value 1 if the individual dies within the following year and 0 if she
does not. Assume that M is the coefficient of variation, i.e., the standard
deviation divided by the mean - a very standard measure of inequality.
Then the "individual risk" approach determines whether a policy improves
equity by comparing the coefficient of variation of (E(ZI), E(Z2), ... ,E(ZN))
in the status quo and given the policy, where E(Z,) is individual i's chance of
dying in the following year. The problem here is that a policy can reduce the
coefficient of variation of (E(Zt), E(Z2) .... E(ZN)), but leave unchanged or
increase the expected coefficient of variation, that is, E(M(Z, ... ,ZN)). If,
for example, the policy does not change the number of individuals who die
in the following year in any given state of the world, but simply shifts
around the identity of those individuals, M(E(ZI), E(Z2) .... E(ZN)) may
decrease, but E(M(Z .... ZN)) will stay the same. A similar deviation
between ex ante and ex post approaches characterizes other standard ine-
quality metrics, such as the Gini coefficient, the Theil index, or the Atkinson
index, and indeed any metric M which is not just a linear function of the Z,.45
The argument for the ex post approach to the measurement of equality
under uncertainty hinges on the "sure thing" principle, which many theorists
take to be a compelling principle of both individual and social rationality.
The argument also appeals to a principle of dynamically consistent choice. I
will not try to summarize the argument for the ex post approach here, but
refer the reader to my work with Sanchirico. 4 1 If one accepts the argument,
an "individual risk" conception of equity is inexorably flawed - not only
"This particular variant of the "individual risk" approach is chosen simply for the sake
of illustration. Other holistic variants of the "individual risk" approach also involve an ex ante
conception of equality under uncertainty - for example, measuring the distribution of the risk
of death during some time period other than a year, or measuring the distribution of the life-
time risk of death in a particular manner (e.g., cancer), or measurng the distribution of life
expectancy.
4 See Adler & Sanchrico, supra note 43, at 304-34.
46 See id. at 334-50.
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in its incrementalist versions, but also in more "holistic" versions that con-
sider a wider range of causes of death.
C. QALY-Based Equity Analysis
The QALY (quality adjusted life year) approach to health policy deci-
sionmaking employs a single measure of health that incorporates both mor-
bidity and longevity. Surveys are used to rank health states on a zero-to-one
scale, with 1 corresponding to perfect health and 0 corresponding to death.
The QALY value of an individual's health history during some stretch of
time or over a lifetime can then be calculated as
T
where 1(h,,) is the quality of individual i's health in period t on a zero-to-one
scale. 47 Policy-analytic tools that incorporate QALYs are widely used in the
literature on health economics and by governments abroad, and have gar-
nered increasing interest in the United States, particularly at the FDA.
QALY-based analysis often takes the form of cost-effectiveness analysis, but
can also take other forms. 48
Health economists, particularly in Britain, have discussed at length the
possibility of inequality measures, or distributively-sensitive policy-analytic
tools, that make use of QALYs.4 9 One suggestion is to apply the Gini coeffi-
cient, coefficient of variation, Theil index, Atkinson index, or some other
inequality metric to the population distribution of expected QALYs.50 An-
other is to evaluate policies by using an SWF that takes individuals' QALY
levels, rather than income levels, as its arguments.5' Yet another is to incor-
porate equity weights into QALY-based cost-effectiveness analysis.52
41 I use l(hz,) here, rather than q(h,.,). as in the additive-across-periods/multiplicative-
within-periods representation of lifetime utility as a function of health and income, see infra
text accompanying notes 105-107, because it is an open question what the connection is be-
tween the I function, i.e., the zero-to-one scaling of health states elicited through QALY
surveys, and the q function.
41 See generally Matthew D. Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETics I, 1-16 (2006) (describing QALY metric, discussing cur-
rent governmental use, and reviewing and citing scholarship).
" See generally Franco Sassi et al., Equity and the Economic Evaluation of Healthcare, 5
HEALTH TECH. ASSESSMENT I, 16-28 (2001) (summarizing this literature).
" See Emmanuela Gakidou et al., Defining and Measuring Health Inequality: An Ap-
proach Based on the Distribution of Health Expectancy, 78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 42
(2000).
"' See, e.g., Paul Dolan, The Measurement of Individual Utility and Social Welfare, 17 J.
HEALTH ECON. 39 (1998); Lars Lindholm & M~ns Ros6n, On the Measurement of the Nation's
Equity Adjusted Health, 7 HEALTH EcON. 621 (1998); Lars Peter Osterdal, Axioms for Health
Care Resource Allocation, 24 J. HEALTH EcON. 679 (2005); Adam Wagstaff, QALYs and the
Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off, 10 J. HEALTH ECON. 21, 35-38 (1991); Alan Williams, Intergener-
ational Equity: An Exploration of the 'Fair Innings' Argument, 6 HEALTH EcON. 117 (1997).
52 See Sassi, supra note 49, at 19-21.
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QALY-based equity analysis improves upon the deficiencies of the en-
vironmental justice and "individual risk" approaches. Unlike the environ-
mental justice approach, it is not committed to a social-gradient conception
of equity. Inter-individual differences in QALYs or expected QALYs can be
counted as an inequality even if the individuals involved have the same so-
cial position. Unlike the "individual risk" approach, QALY-based equity
analysis is sensitive to inequalities in health as well as longevity. Further-
more, unlike that approach, QALY-based equity analysis is not committed to
an ex ante conception of egalitarianism under uncertainty. Many of the
health economists who write about QALYs and equity do, in fact, adopt an
ex ante conception;53 but the basic construct of a QALY, as an integrated
measure of health and longevity, is just as amenable to the ex post approach.
If M is an inequality metric - for example, the Gini coefficient - and Z, is
a random variable representing an individual's lifetime QALYs, one could
calculate E(M(ZI, . . . ZN)): the expected inequality of the distribution of
lifetime QALYs, as calculated considering various possible states of the
world and the Gini coefficient of the population distribution of QALYs in
each state. The same is true, of course, for other inequality metrics.
However, QALY-based equity analysis is problematic because it over-
looks inequalities arising from differences in income. It shares this flaw
with the "individual risk" approach. Consider, first, the variant of QALY-
based analysis just discussed: calculating the value of E(M(Z .... ZN)) for
the status quo and for policy alternatives, with M an inequality metric and Z,
a random variable representing individual i's lifetime QALYs. In this for-
mat, individuals are solely characterized in terms of their lifetime QALYs,
which subsume their health and longevity but not their incomes. A policy
might reduce the expected Gini coefficient of lifetime QALYs, but increase
the expected Gini coefficient of lifetime income or of lifetime utility (de-
fined as a function of health, longevity and income). A parallel critique
applies to the proposal to use QALYs as arguments for a social welfare
function.54
What about the proposal to incorporate equity weights in QALY-based
cost-effectiveness analysis? QALY-based cost-effectiveness analysis evalu-
ates policies by measuring health or longevity impacts in QALYs, and by
measuring other impacts in dollars. Cutoff ratios are specified (such as
$100,000 per QALY), and the decision rule is to implement a policy if its
cost/QALY ratio is below the cutoff.5 Normally, the QALY benefits of a
policy are calculated by determining the expected increase in total QALYs.
13 See, e.g., Gakidou et al., supra note 50, at 43-44; Magnus Johannesson, Should We
Aggregate Relative or Absolute Changes in QALYs?, 10 HEALTH ECON. 573, 574-75 (2001);
Williams, supra note 51, at 120-21.
14 Namely, a policy might reduce the expected value of a given social welfare function
taking individual lifetime QALYs as its arguments, but increase the expected value of that
same social welfare function now taking individual utility as a function of individual longev-
ity, health, and income as its arguments. This latter approach is just PPPA.
51 More precisely, the decision rule compares the incremental cost-effectiveness of poli-
cies with cutoff ratios. See Adler, supra note 48, at 8-9, 85-88.
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Equity weights would adjust this calculation by giving greater weight to
QALY changes affecting those at a lower level of lifetime or sublifetime
QALYs.
Income impacts are not completely ignored by this framework. The in-
come-reduction effect of a policy will show up as dollar costs; ceteris
paribus, a policy that produces a larger reduction in incomes will have a
higher cost/QALY ratio. The difficulty, rather, is that the framework ignores
inequalities in income. Imagine two policies which have identical health
impacts and which also have the same aggregate monetary costs. In one
case, those costs are borne by high-income individuals. In the other case,
they are borne by low-income individuals. QALY based cost-effectiveness
analysis, both in the traditional form and in the equity-weighted form, will
not distinguish between the policies. The equity weights are a function of
individual QALY levels and come into play in determining the denominator
of the cost/QALY ratio for a policy; they are not a function of individual
income levels and do not change the numerator of that ratio.
D. Incidence Analysis
The framework of "incidence analysis" characterizes taxes as progres-
sive, regressive, or proportional, depending on whether the tax burden as a
proportion of income increases, decreases, or remains the same as individual
income increases.5 6 Some scholarly work employing this framework has
been undertaken in the area of risk regulation. 7 It has typically focused on
the incidence of environmental taxes; but incidence analysis is also applica-
ble to other sorts of policy measures, and indeed in a few cases has been
undertaken for non-tax environmental measures, such as tradeable emissions
permits. A non-tax measure that raises or lowers firms' costs of production
will affect employee wages, shareholder incomes, and consumer surplus.
The income equivalent of these changes can be calculated for representative
members of different income groups (defined by annual or lifetime in-
come),5 and that burden as a fraction of the individual's total income can be
calculated.
Incidence analysis in the environmental area has typically ignored
health and longevity impacts. The burden of a tax or non-tax measure on a
given individual has typically been understood as the income equivalent of
the change in her tax payments, wages, consumer surplus, and/or profits re-
ceived as a firm shareholder, excluding the benefits or costs resulting from a
change in her fatality risk or health state. The flaw here is reciprocal to the
flaw in QALY-based equity analysis. The equity impact of a risk regulation
" See DON FULLERTON & DIANE Lim ROGERS, WHO BEARS THE LIFETIME TAX BURDEN?
1-17 (1993).
" See generally Ian W.H. Parry et al., The Incidence of Pollution Control Policies 10-19
(Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 05-24, June 2005) (reviewing literature), available
at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-05-24.pdf.58 See id. at 5-6, 14.
[Vol. 32
HeinOnline  -- 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 18 2008
Adler, Risk Equity: A New Proposal
is a function both of its impact on the distribution of income (which the
QALY-based approaches ignore), and of its impact on the distribution of
health and longevity (which incidence analysis, as just described, ignores).
This flaw is not an inevitable feature of incidence analysis. The analyst
could characterize the total effect of an environmental measure on members
of different income groups, including its effect on their health, longevity,
wages, shareholder earnings, and any other measurable aspect of well-being.
The income equivalent of that effect could then be determined. The measure
could be characterized as progressive, regressive, or proportional depending
on whether this inclusive burden as a proportion of income increases, de-
creases, or remains the same with increasing income. 9
However, this inclusive template for incidence analysis remains prob-
lematic. One large problem is that the approach provides no guidance in
balancing equity against the improvement of overall well-being. A measure
may be regressive but still morally justified, all things considered, if the gain
to overall welfare is sufficiently large. Second, although it seems feasible to
make incidence analysis inclusive in measuring burdens (the "numerator"
for determining progressivity/regresssivity), it is much less clear how inci-
dence analysis would be rendered inclusive with respect to the "denomina-
tor" for incidence analysis. What if a measure creates burdens that increase
as a fraction of incomes as individual incomes increase (thus is progressive
using this denominator), but decrease as a fraction of lifetime QALYs as
lifetime QALYs increase (thus is regressive using this denominator)? In this
sort of case, the incidence analyst either uses income as the denominator (in
which case the analysis overlooks the possibility that some individuals at a
relatively high level of income are at a relatively lower level of well-being,
given poor health or short longevity, or vice versa), or she uses something
like utility as a function of health, longevity, and income as the denominator
(in which case it is unclear why the analyst doesn't simply move beyond the
incidence-analysis framework, and use utility numbers as inputs for an ine-
quality metric 6° or PPPA).
E. Inclusive Equality Measurement
As already discussed, inequality metrics such as the Gini coefficient,
coefficient of variation, Theil index, or Atkinson index might be used in the
risk regulation domain.6' One possibility is to measure the inequality of "in-
dividual risks"; another possibility is to measure the inequality of individu-
als' expected QALYs or (even better) the expected inequality of individuals'
QALYs.
We have seen that these particular proposals are problematic because
they ignore incomes. But inequality metrics are not necessarily focused on
" See id. at 25.
6oSee infra Part I.E.61 See supra text accompanying note 50.
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health and longevity to the exclusion of incomes, or on incomes to the exclu-
sion of health and longevity. An inclusive inequality-measurement tool sen-
sitive to the distribution of health, longevity, and income could be developed
using "utility functions" - a device elaborated below, in connection with
PPPA.62 The status quo and the policy could be seen as probability distribu-
tions across population profiles of individual utilities, where each individ-
ual's utility is in turn a function of her longevity, health, and income. We
could calculate the expected Gini coefficient (for example) of individual
utility, for both the status quo and the policy; if the policy has a lower value,
it reduces expected inequality.
The inclusive inequality-measurement approach to risk equity, thus
structured, would seem to be an improvement on the incidence-analysis ap-
proach. Unlike incidence analysis, it readily yields an overall verdict about
the equality impact of policies whose fractional burdens move in one direc-
tion as individuals are made better off with respect to some dimensions of
well-being (e.g., income), but a different direction as individuals are made
better off with respect to other dimensions (e.g., health).
However, inclusive inequality measurement shares an important flaw
with incidence analysis. Inequality metrics can tell us whether a proposed
policy's distribution of individual well-being is more or less equal than the
status quo distribution. Inequality metrics cannot tell us whether the policy
is better or worse than the status quo, all things considered. They cannot
yield a final verdict concerning the policy, given its impacts both on the
distribution of well-being and on overall well-being. A policy analyst might
find that cost-benefit analysis (a good proxy for overall well-being) favors
the status quo, while the policy reduces the expected degree of inequality as
measured by some inequality metric. Inequality metrics provide no gui-
dance in making this sort of choice - in balancing distributive and aggrega-
tive concerns. 63
By contrast, PPPA does provide the requisite guidance. PPPA sub-
sumes both a concern for overall well-being and a concern for the equal
distribution of well-being. At the same time, PPPA can provide exactly the
sort of information provided by inequality metrics, if we find that informa-
tion useful: namely how policies compare purely as a matter of equality.
These points will be elaborated below. 64
F. Cost-Benefit Analysis with Distributive Weights
Cost-benefit analysis ("CBA") compares a policy to the status quo by
summing the monetary amounts that individuals who are benefited by the
policy are willing to pay ("WTP") for it, and subtracting the amounts that
62 See infra Part Il.B.2.
63 See Louis Kaplow, Why Measure Inequality? 5-6 (Harvard Law Sch. Olin Discussion
Paper No. 386, 2002).
64 See infra Part II.C.
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individuals made worse off by the policy are willing to accept ("WTA") in
return for it.65 Economists have periodically suggested that cost-benefit
analysis could be sensitized to equity by multiplying individual WTPIWTA
amounts by a weighting factor that decreases with greater individual in-
come.6 6 Although this approach has not been adopted by U.S. governmental
bodies, it has been adopted in Britain and, in the past, at the World Bank.67
At first blush, distributively-weighted CBA seems to provide a very
attractive approach to risk equity. It takes a "population" rather than a so-
cial gradient approach: individuals with different incomes but identical so-
cial positions will receive different weights. It is inclusive with respect to
the determinants of well-being: one can calculate individual WTPIWTA
amounts, not merely for changes that directly affect income (such as changes
in prices, wages, or earnings received as a firm shareholder), but also for
changes in health and in longevity risks. Similarly, it is possible in principle
to make the weighting factor for a given individual's WTPJWTA amounts a
function of her health and longevity as well as her income. Finally, by con-
trast with incidence analysis and inequality measurement, distributively-
weighted CBA provides guidance in balancing equity with overall welfare.
The sum of weighted WTP/WTA amounts is meant to indicate whether, on
balance, a policy should be pursued, given both distributive and aggregative
considerations.
However, the proponents of distributively weighted CBA must confront
a number of difficult issues involving the identification and application of
weights. To begin, what determines the choice of weights? Consider the
simplest sort of case, in which individuals are all healthy and long-lived, and
differ only in their incomes. In the status quo, there are equal numbers of
rich and poor individuals: the rich with annual incomes of $100,000, the
poor with annual incomes of $20,000. A policy benefits the poor but makes
the rich worse off. Each poor individual is WTP $250 for the policy, while
each rich individual is WTA $300. From the perspective of unweighted
CBA, the policy is a net social loss. From the perspective of weighted CBA,
it will be a net social gain, if the weighting factor applied to poor individu-
als' WTP/WTA amounts is more than 6/5 (300/250) the weighting factor
applied to rich individuals' WTPIWTA amounts. But should the ratio of the
weighting factors be larger or smaller than 6/5?
Second, the straightforward procedure of assigning each individual a
weight depending on her level of welfare-relevant characteristics in the sta-
tus quo (her status quo income, health, longevity, etc.) must be revised for
policy choices that involve large changes in some of those characteristics.
65 See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 1, at 1-5.
66 See Olof Johansson-Stenman, Distributional Weights in Cost-Benefit Analysis-Should
We Forget About Them?, 81 LAND ECON. 337 (2005).
67 See H.M. TREASURY, THE GREEN BOOK: APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION IN CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT 24-25, 91-96 (2003), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3/F/
greenbook 260907.pdf, Jean Dr~ze, Distribution Matters in Cost-Benefit Analysis: Comment
on K.A. Brekke, 70 J. PUB. ECON. 485, 486 (1998).
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Again, assume healthy and equally long-lived individuals and imagine that
the status quo and the policy each, with certainty, produce a given distribu-
tion of annual income. In one case, the policy produces a small change in
each individual's annual income; in the second case, it produces a large
change in the annual income of some individuals.
"S MALL" POLICY
Status Quo Income with
Individual Income Policy WTP/WTA68
1 $100,000 $98,000 -$2,000
2 $100,000 $98,000 -$2,000
3 $ 20,000 $21,000 $1,000
4 $ 20,000 $21,000 $1,000
"LARGE" POLICY
Status Quo Income with
Individual Income Policy WTP/WTA
1 $100,000 $98,000 -$ 2,000
2 $100,000 $50,000 -$50,000
3 $ 20,000 $21,000 $ 1,000
4 $ 20,000 $70,000 $50,000
Assume that we have somehow developed a set of weights for WTP/
WTA amounts as a function of annual income. The weight WlooK is the
weight for an annual income of $100,000. In addition, assume (as seems
plausible) that W10K = 1W98K, and that W2oK=W 2K. It is then straightforward to
evaluate the small policy. The $2,000 annual losses of individuals 1 and 2
can be weighted by either W10oK or w98K (which are approximately equal), and
then subtracted from the $1,000 gains of individuals 3 and 4, weighted by
either w20K or W21K (once more, approximately equal). But it is not straight-
forward to evaluate the large project. Should we weight individual 2's WTP/
WTA amount ($50,000) by the weight for his annual income in the status
quo, w00K, or by the weight for his annual income in the policy outcome,
W5oK? Similarly, should we weight individual 4's WTP/WTA amount (also
68 These are the changes in annual income amounts in the policy outcome that make the
individual indifferent between the status quo and the policy. Strictly speaking, these changes
are not WTP/WTA amounts - since an individual's WTP/WTA is usually understood as a
present, one-time payment sufficient to make her indifferent between the policy and the status
quo. To calculate WTP/WTA amounts in this standard sense, we would need to know how
long the individuals live and what the discount rate is. For simplicity, then, my example uses
WTP/WTA defined as compensating changes to annual income. The point of the example -
namely, that large changes in individual incomes pose difficulties for the specification of
weights - is unaffected by the choice of annual versus one-time compensation measures.
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$50,000) by the weight for his annual income in the status quo, W2oK, or by
the weight for his annual income in the policy outcome, W70K?
A third and related problem concerns the application of weights under
conditions of uncertainty. It is highly unrealistic to assume that the poli-
cymaker knows for sure which outcome would result from each choice
available to her. More realistically, each choice leads to a probability distri-
bution across outcomes rather than a particular, certain outcome. But then
the problem of identifying a weight for each individual becomes yet thorn-
ier. With respect to income, for example, each choice leads to an array of
state-dependent incomes for each individual. Even with a function from in-
come levels to weights in hands, how are we to apply this function under
conditions of uncertainty, given that neither the status quo nor the policy
produces a single income level for any given individual?
In short, the proponent of distributively-weighted CBA needs a norma-
tive account of equality, sufficient to provide answers to these sorts of ques-
tions about the specification and application of weights. The only plausible
such account which has been proposed in the literature on distributive
weighting is the SWF account: distributive weights should be attached to
WTPIWTA amounts so as to mimic the application of a social welfare
function.6 9
Is it true that for any given SWF we can calculate WTP/WTA amounts
and assign distributive weights so as to replicate the choices of the SWF?
The answer is not obvious. Further, even if a particular SWF can be mim-
icked through weighted WTP/WTA amounts, it is far from clear why SWFs
should be applied indirectly via the mediating device of weighted CBA,
rather than directly. One argument for indirect application, that distribu-
tively-weighted CBA is a simpler procedure, is undercut by the above exam-
ples. For any given individual, her weighted WTP/WTA amount for a policy
choice will be a function of the array of state-dependent determinants of
well-being (income, health, longevity) that she would face if the policy were
chosen, and the array of these state-dependent determinants that she would
face if the status quo were chosen. This is just the information that the direct
application of an SWF requires. Finally, even if weighted CBA does ulti-
mately prove to be a simpler and more administrable decision procedure for
incorporating equity, we should experiment with the direct application of
SWFs, to help build the social knowledge base regarding the workings of
SWFs that would be needed to develop a functioning system of weighted
CBA.
A different difficulty, specifically relevant to distributively weighted
CBA as a conception of risk equity, concerns the way in which CBA values
longevity. In current practice, CBA translates longevity impacts into WTP/
69 See Johansson-Stenman, supra note 66, at 337-38, 340-42; Parry, supra note 57, at 26-
29. See also Liqun Liu, Combining Distributional Weights and the Marginal Cost of Funds:
The Concept of Person-Specific Marginal Cost of Funds, 34 PuB. FIN. REV. 60, 63-64 (2006)
(discussing use of SWF to set the marginal cost of funds).
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WTA amounts using the "value of statistical life" ("VSL") approach, which
asks what individuals are willing to pay or accept for changes in their risk of
premature death.70 If social choice under uncertainty should follow the ex
post rather than ex ante approach, then the VSL approach is problematic.
There will be cases where CBA using the VSL approach will fail to track the
judgments of any social welfare function applied in an ex post manner.7
The following example illustrates the point. In one case a population of
N individuals is exposed to a toxin in the status quo. The individuals are
identical, except that only one unknown individual is susceptible to the toxin
and will die prematurely for sure if it is not eliminated. In the second case, a
small subpopulation of L within this broader population is exposed to the
toxin. In this second case, one unknown individual in the subpopulation is
susceptible to the toxin and will die prematurely for sure if it is not elimi-
nated. In each case, there is a policy to eliminate the toxin, with costs TC
borne by T taxpayers who (for simplicity) are identical and external to the
population of N individuals. Imagine that each individual's WTP not to be
exposed to a 1-in-N risk of dying from the toxin is V and that each individ-
ual's WTP not to be exposed to a 1-in-L risk of dying from the toxin is V*.
Unweighted CBA using the VSL approach will value the policy in the
first case as NV - TC. It will value the policy in the second case as LV* -
TC. Since WTP is not proportional to the risk reduction for large risk reduc-
tions, these need not be the same amount and may indeed differ dramati-
cally. (Imagine that N is 1 million and L is 5.) Weighted CBA, let us
imagine, employs weights that are sensitive to individual income and ex-
pected longevity, and therefore has different weights for taxpayers (desig-
nate the weight for taxpayers as wT), members of the population who are
exposed to a 1-in-N risk of dying from the toxin (wN), and members of the
population who are exposed to a 1-in-L risk of dying from the toxin (wL),
with w' > wN.72 So weighted CBA will value the first policy as N x w x V -
T x wT x C. Weighted CBA will value the second policy as L x wL x V* - T
x wT x C. Again, the two valuations can differ.
Because both unweighted and weighted CBA can give different valua-
tions to the two policies, it is possible that both unweighted and weighted
CBA will yield different choices in the two cases: favoring the policy in one
case but the status quo in the other. But any social welfare function which is
sensitive to distribution and is applied in an expost manner will treat the two
7 See Adler, Against "Individual Risk," supra note 1, at 1197-98, 1198 n.300.
7' See also James K. Hammitt & Nicolas Treich, Statistical Versus Identified Lives in Ben-
efit-Cost Analysis. 35 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 45 (2005) (showing that CBA, using the VSL
method, may deviate from a utilitarian SWF that maximizes the sum of expected utilities
because that method is sensitive to information about the distribution of individual fatality
risks that the utilitarian SWF would ignore).
72 1 say that w' > wN to accommodate both the possibility that the weights for the exposed
individuals are determined by their attributes in the status quo (in which case wL > w) and the
possibility that those weights are determined by their attributes with the policy (in which case
wL = w"). However these weights are set, weighted CBA can deviate from an SWF applied in
an ex post manner.
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cases as identical.73 The ex post account of social choice under uncertainty
views equity as a matter of the distribution of realized, not expected, well-
being. Each status quo involves the same distribution of realized well-being:
taxpayers reach a certain level, members of the population reach a different
level, and the unfortunate individual who dies from the toxin yet a different
level.74 Each policy also produces the same distribution of realized well-
being: now everyone in the population reaches the same level of well-being,
and the taxpayers reach a different level.
In short, CBA using the VSL approach - even CBA incorporating dis-
tributive weights - is a less than fully accurate proxy for any distributively
sensitive SWF applied in an ex post manner under uncertainty.
II. A NEW APPROACH: PROBABILISTIC POPULATION PROFILE ANALYSIS
This Part describes in detail how equity considerations could be brought
to bear on risk policy choices via a technique I call "probabilistic population
profile analysis" ("PPPA").
PPPA represents one particular format for analyzing policy choices
through the application of a social welfare function. Section A summarizes
the philosophical basis for PPPA. Section B describes PPPA itself, and dis-
cusses its feasibility. Section C clarifies the connection between PPPA,
equality measurement, and cost-benefit analysis.
A. Social Welfare Functions and the Philosophical Basis for PPPA
The SWF approach to distributive issues has been developed within
theoretical welfare economics75 and has been used in the optimal tax litera-
ture to study tax policies.76 SWFs have also been used, in a few academic
works, to evaluate environmental regulation.
77
71 For that matter, a utilitarian SWF which is applied in an ex post or ex ante manner will
treat the two cases as identical. From the ex post perspective, the two cases are identical; and a
utilitarian SWF always reaches the same verdicts whether applied ex post or ex ante. See
Adler and Sanchirico, supra note 43, at 307. Only a distributively-sensitive SWF applied in an
ex ante manner might treat the two cases as different.
" To be sure, this is only true if the amount and distribution of fear in the two cases are
the same. See generally Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the
Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI-KENT L. REV. 977 (2004). The hypothetical should there-
fore be structured so that no individual experiences a different fear state in the status quo in the
first case than in the second case, and so that no individual experiences a different fear state
with the policy in the first case than in the second case. In particular, it might be assumed that
the exposed populations in the two cases are unaware of their exposures.
15 See ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE. WELFARE ECONOMICS 137-69 (1984).76 See MATTI TUOMALA, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX AND REDISTRIBUTION 1-14 (1990);
Nicholas Stem, The Theory of Optimal Commodity and Income Taxation: An Introduction, in
THE THEORY OF TAXATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 22 (David Newberry & Nicholas
Stem eds., 1987).
71 See Parry et al., supra note 57, at 26-28. A recent article by Marc Fleurbaey addresses
issues of health equity using the SWF framework. See Marc Fleurbaey, Health Equity and
Social Welfare, 83/84 ANNALES D'ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTiQUE 21 (2006). Unfortunately, I
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The approach is welfarist. It assumes that individual well-being is the
sole morally relevant information about outcomes, and that principles of
equality govern the distribution of well-being. This might be seen as a limi-
tation of the approach. But "welfare" can be construed broadly, to encom-
pass anything that improves the quality of an individual's life. More
precisely, the welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing features of a life might
plausibly be understood as those features that individuals with full informa-
tion and good deliberative conditions would converge in preferring or dis-
preferring. Individual well-being, on this ideal-preference account, arguably
encompasses the quality of an individual's experiences, health states, intel-
lectual life, practical accomplishments, relationships with friends and family,
and standing and participation in the broader community. 8 To be sure, mea-
suring all these items is a big challenge. But the crucial point to understand
here is that the SWF framework is potentially inclusive with respect to the
constituents of welfare.
The SWF approach employs a characteristic mathematical formalism to
represent welfarist moral judgment. Each outcome 9 is mapped onto a vector
of "utility numbers," representing each individual's well-being in that out-
come. A given SWF is, in turn, a particular mathematical function that takes
the utility vector for each outcome and assigns it a single number. That
social welfare number represents how good or bad the outcome is, morally
speaking, as compared to other outcomes.
THE SWF FRAMEWORK
Social
Utility function welfare
U(V4) function W
Outcome Ok= Vectorof Social value
profile of life utilities W(U1 . UN)
histories (U 1 U ...... UN)(L,,L 2. .LN)
In what way is the SWF framework sensitive to distributive concerns?
A crucial point is that the set of possible social welfare functions includes
not merely the utilitarian SWF, which simply adds up individual utilities, but
became aware of Fleurbaey's article as this Article was going to press and was not able to
revise the Article to discuss how it bears on my analysis.
" See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 1, at 25-39; Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A
Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1875, 1904-05, 1959-68 (2006).
'9 By "outcome," I mean a set of possible worlds that is homogenous with respect to each
individual's well-being. A possible world is a completely specified possible history of the
universe. A different definition of outcome is also conceivable: one might just define an out-
come as a single possible world and conceptualize SWFs as operating on utility vectors corre-
sponding to each possible world. But this definition unnecessarily inflates the number of
outcomes, since every possible world within each set of possible worlds homogeneous with
respect to each individual's well-being would have the same utility vector.
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also a wide array of distributively sensitive or "equity regarding" SWFs.
The formal expression of distributive sensitivity is the so-called "Pigou-Dal-
ton" principle. This principle stipulates that shifting utility from someone at
a higher utility level to someone at a lower level, without changing total
utility, must increase the value of the SWF.80
THE PIGOU-DALTON PRINCIPLE
(1, 5, 10, 15) = utility vector for outcome Ok
Transfer of two units of utility from theJ third to the second individual, keeping total
utility constant
(1, 7, 8, 15) = utility vector for outcome Oh
The Pigou-Dalton principle requires that the SWF, W,
prefer Oh to Ok. Note that the utilitarian SWF ranks the
two outcomes as equally good.
Anyone proposing to employ the SWF framework for policy choice
must confront a number of basic philosophical issues. First, which distribu-
tively-sensitive SWF should drive the analysis? While there is only one util-
itarian SWF, an infinite number of SWFs satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle.
The optimal-tax literature has focused on a particular family of distribu-
tively-sensitive SWFs, the "Atkinsonian" family. As I will elaborate below,
this family of distributively sensitive SWFs indeed has attractive properties,
and PPPA should principally draw on SWFs within this family. The rank-
weighted SWF, a different sort of distributively sensitive SWF, might also
be used.8 '
A second basic question involves the time slice. Is equality a matter of
equalizing individuals' lifetime well-being, or rather of equalizing well-be-
ing during some temporal fraction of their lives, such as annual or momen-
tary well-being? Formally, do the individual utility numbers upon which
SWFs operate represent lifetime utilities or "sublifetime" utilities? I have
argued at length elsewhere for the lifetime view and will not repeat those
arguments here.8 2
A third question involves the application of SWFs under conditions of
uncertainty. Absent uncertainty, each policy choice available to a deci-
sionmaker corresponds to a particular vector of lifetime utilities: the particu-
80 See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 43, at 296-304.
81 See infra Part II.B.3.
82 See Adler, supra note 42.
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lar outcome that the choice would produce. Given uncertainty, each policy
choice corresponds to a set of vectors of lifetime utilities: the set of possible
outcomes that the choice might produce, each assigned a probability. For-
mally, each individual's lifetime utility is a random variable U,, and an out-
come is a realization of random variables U, through UN, with N individuals
in the population. The question then arises whether the social welfare func-
tion should be applied to a given choice in an ex post or ex ante manner. As
mentioned, Chris Sanchirico and I have elsewhere defended the ex post ap-
proach.83 If W is the social welfare function, and E is the expectation opera-
tor, the ex post approach is to calculate E(W(U1. ... , UN)) for each choice,
while the ex ante approach is to apply the social welfare function to the
vector of expected utilities associated with each choice, i.e., to calculate
W(E(U 1), E(U 2), . . . , E(UN)) for each choice.
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Application of an SWF: An Example
W = the sum of the square root of individual utilities. There are 2 individuals in the population, Jim and
June. A policymaker is choosing between the status quo (which has two equiprobable outcomes, A and B).
and a policy (which also has two equiprobable outcomes, C and D). The numbers in the tables are the
individuals' utilities in each possible outcome.
STATUS QUO POLICY
Outcome Outcome
A B C D
p=.5 p=. 5  p=.5 p=.5
Jim 4 9 Jim's expected utility = 6.5 3.5 3.5 Jim's exp. utility 3.5
June 0 4 June's expected utility 2 3.5 3.5 June's exp. utility 3.5
W(A)=2 W(B)=5 W(C)=W(D)=3.74
(4/4+4]0) ( 9 + 44) (4/3.5 +43.5)
W applied ex ante to the status quo: W applied ex ante to the policy:
q6.5+12 3.96 q13.5+ 43.5 =3.74
W applied ex post to the status quo: W applied ex post to the policy:
2x.5+5x.5=3.5 3.74x.5 + 3.74x.5 = 3.74
Note that if W is applied in an ex ante manner, the status quo is favored over the policy: 3.96 > 3.74.
However, if W is applied in an ex post manner, the policy is favored over the status quo: 3 5 < 3.74.
B. PPPA, Step by Step
PPPA represents a concrete attempt to operationalize the SWF frame-
work described in Section A: namely, one that employs an equity-regarding
SWF which is applied to lifetime utilities, and which is applied in an ex post
rather than ex ante manner.
PPPA begins by specifying a population of interest. This might be lim-
ited to U.S. citizens who are currently alive, or it might include other indi-
viduals, such as foreign citizens or future or past generations. For simplicity,
I will focus on the case in which the population of interest comprises current
" See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 43.
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U.S. citizens. In that case, there are N = 300 million individuals in the popu-
lation, and the same N exist in all possible outcomes. 4
Each individual i has different possible life histories. Each possible
outcome 0 k is a possible combination or "population profile" of life histo-
ries, one for each of the N individuals. If there are K such possible combina-
tions, then there are K possible outcomes {O .... OK}. Each outcome has
the form (L, L2, . . ., LN), where L, is a possible life history for individual 1,
L 2 a possible life history for individual 2, and so forth. Let us say that Li.k is
the particular life history that individual i lives in outcome 0 k.
Each possible life history L,.k is a description of certain welfare-relevant
facts about individual i's life. What facts exactly? I propose that each Li.k
include those facts about individual i that are readily measurable given cur-
rent available metrics. In particular, at least for purposes of analyzing the
equity implications of risk policy, L,.k should include all the various facts
highlighted by the different literatures on risk equity described in Part I:
health, longevity, income, and perhaps readily measurable markers of social
position (paradigmatically, race and gender). The QALY and "individual
risk" literatures underscore the measurability of impacts on health and lon-
gevity, and the importance of health and longevity for individual well-being.
The incidence-analysis literature underscores the measurability of income
impacts, and the importance of income for individual well-being. Finally, as
regards the literature on environmental justice, one can reject the social-gra-
dient approach but preserve the insight that social position can impair indi-
vidual flourishing.
In short, L,,k consists of the following sorts of facts.
- The life-span of individual i in outcome 0 k
- The income of individual i during each period she is alive in out-
come 0 k
- The health state of individual i during each period she is alive in
outcome Ok
- Measurable markers of individual i's social position (such as race
and gender)
This template for L,.k is not meant to be rigid. To begin, there are im-
portant constituents of well-being, such as the individual's experiential states
(happiness), relationships with friends and family, or accomplishments at
work or in the community, that are not included on the list because they are
more difficult to measure with current metrics.8 5 Reciprocally, income is not
4 Variable-population issues pose a difficult set of problems for social choice theory
which I will not attempt to engage here. See generally CHARLES BLACKORBY ET AL., POPULA-
TION ISSUES IN SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, WELFARE ECONOMICS, AND ETHICS (2005). Ex-
tending PPPA to the variable-population case is a topic for further research.
85 To be sure, there is a burgeoning literature on the measurement of happiness, but I take
it that data on the current population distribution of happiness, and on how policies perturb
that. is still thinner than data on health and income. In any event, as mentioned immediately
below, PPPA certainly could be modified to incorporate happiness data and have lifetime utili-
ties be partly determined by happiness. Crucially, however, happiness is not the sole compo-
nent of well-being. For citations to the happiness literature and a discussion of the connection
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a direct constituent of well-being but is on the list. Income is a "resource"
or "primary good" that allows individuals to advance their well-being in
various ways, and income measurement techniques are very well developed.
Different variants of PPPA might replace income with consumption or omit
both income and consumption and conceptualize each life history as a set of
facts concerning the individual's longevity, health, experiential life, social
position, friendships and family relationships, and the other attributes of
human lives that are directly constitutive of well-being. However, the lon-
gevity-health-income-social position characterization seems more tractable
for now.
The construct of a population profile is one of the key building blocks
of PPPA. Another is a utility function, U, that maps each individual L,k onto
a lifetime utility number U(L,.k). The final one is a social welfare function W
that maps a vector of N lifetime utilities onto a single "social welfare"
number.
Using these building blocks, PPPA proceeds as follows. (1) A policy
choice situation, consisting of the status quo choice of inaction plus at least
one alternative, is given exogenously. 6 (2) Each available policy choice
corresponds to a probabilistic population profile, that is, to a probability dis-
tribution across population profiles. In other words, if {O1, .-. ., OK} is the
set of all possible outcomes, i.e., all possible population profiles, then each
choice corresponds to a probability distribution across these outcomes. Risk
assessment techniques and techniques for estimating the income impact of
policy choices are used to determine which probabilistic population profile
corresponds to a given choice. (3) The utility function U is used to trans-
form each possible population profile Ok of individual longevity-health-in-
come-social position histories, Ok = (Ll.k,L2,k,...LNk), into an N-entry vector
of lifetime utilities, one for each individual in the population. Each choice
therefore becomes a probability distribution across lifetime utility vectors.
(4) The social welfare function W is applied to each choice - characterized
as a probability distribution across lifetime utility vectors - in an ex post
manner. The choice with the greatest expected W-value is that choice which
is best, on balance, given both equity concerns and concerns about overall
well-being.
Even if this approach is philosophically well-grounded, is it truly feasi-
ble? I will discuss the various steps of the approach in turn.
between happiness and well-being, see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Re-
search and Cost-Benefit Analysis (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 07-
15, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999928.
86 Our best-developed policy-analytic tools, such as CBA, provide rigorous guidance in
choosing among a given set of options, not in identifying the initial choice set. See Matthew
D. Adler, Rational Choice, Rational Agenda-Setting, and Constitutional Law: Does the Con-
stitution Require Basic or Strengthened Public Rationality?, in LINKING POLITICS AND LAW
109, 113-14 (Christoph Engel & Adrienne HWritier eds., 2003). PPPA is similar to CBA in this
regard.
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1. The Predictive Step: Mapping Choices onto Probabilistic
Population Profiles
PPPA characterizes each choice as a probability distribution or lottery
across population profiles, where each profile or outcome has the form Ok =
(LIkL2,k,...,Lm~k) and each L,,k includes information about individual i's lifes-
pan, her health states in all the periods in which she is alive, her income in
all the periods in which she is alive, and her measurable social position. For
simplicity, I will assume that the relevant periods are years.
One aspect of this task is characterizing the effect of policy choices on
each individual's possible income sequences over her lifetime. That task
would presumably involve general equilibrium modeling. We have a model
of the economy in the status quo, with some random elements, producing a
probability distribution across population profiles. Each profile has informa-
tion about each of the N individuals' wages, capital income, and perhaps
other sources of earnings, in each period. A policy intervention perturbs this
model in some way, leading to a different distribution of incomes.
General-equilibrium modeling is an established technique,87 and a sub-
stantial number of studies have been undertaken that employ such models in
the environmental context: to characterize the incidence of policies' burdens
on different groups; to determine whether policies have net costs or benefits;
and, in a few cases, to evaluate environmental policies with reference to an
SWF. 88 Most relevant for my purposes, here, is the fact that general equilib-
rium models have been used to estimate the effect of policies on the distribu-
tion of lifetime incomes. A particularly thorough and impressive example is
work by Fullerton and Rogers, who engage in modeling to characterize the
progressivity of various taxes with respect to lifetime income. As they sum-
marize their approach:
[W]e build a general equilibrium simulation that encompasses all
major U.S. taxes, many industries, both corporate and
noncorporate sectors within each industry, and consumers identi-
fied by both age and lifetime income. It is not a model of annual
decisionmaking, but a life-cycle model in which each individual
receives a particular inheritance, a set of tax rules, a wage profile,
and a transfer profile. Each then plans an entire lifetime of labor
supply, savings, goods demands, and bequests. We also look at
each industry's use of labor, capital, and intermediate inputs. We
can then simulate the effects of a tax change on each economic
decision through time. We calculate new labor supplies, savings,
capital stocks, outputs, and prices....
87 See EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 126-30 (2000).
g See id.; Parry, supra note 57; Klaus Conrad, Computable General Equilibrium Models
in Environmental and Resource Economics, in THE INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 2002/2003 66, 66 (Tom Tietenberg & Henk Folmer eds.,
2002).
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... [W]e evaluate the effects of each U.S. tax by comparing
its estimated burdens with those of a proportional tax .... In our
lifetime framework, a progressive tax is one in which the lifetime
tax burden as a fraction of lifetime income rises as lifetime income
rises, and a regressive tax is one in which the lifetime tax burden
as a fraction of lifetime income falls as lifetime income [rises].8 9
Fullerton and Rogers are engaged in lifetime-income incidence analy-
sis, while I am advocating a different approach to equity analysis, namely
PPPA. What their work demonstrates, for my purposes, is that the kinds of
models and techniques that would be required to estimate population profiles
of individual income sequences, and changes in such profiles caused by poli-
cies, are already in use.90
What about the health and longevity characteristics of individual life
histories? Describing the health and longevity characteristics of a given
population, such as the U.S. citizenry, is already the focus of a large amount
of work by public health scholars and organizations.9" Describing the
change in status quo morbidity and premature mortality that would result
from policies falls under the rubric of risk assessment - also a large area of
existing work.92
Of course, neither population health characterization, nor risk assess-
ment, currently focuses on the particular sort of information required by
PPPA - namely, a probability distribution across population profiles. Ig-
noring lifetime-income information for the moment, PPPA would presuma-
bly work along something like the following lines. Existing population data
would be used to calibrate a lifetime health-and-longevity model for the N
individuals in the population. The model would assign an annual probability
of both death and morbidity (perhaps summarized in a QALY value) to each
individual. These probabilities could be a function not only of the individ-
ual's age but also of other characteristics. Running the N models once would
produce a particular population health-and-longevity profile. Doing this re-
peatedly would produce a probability distribution across population health-
and-longevity profiles for the status quo. A policy's effect consists in chang-
ing mortality and/or morbidity probabilities for some individuals in some
years. Running the altered N models repeatedly would produce a probabilis-
tic population health-and-longevity profile associated with the policy.
The approach to generating probabilistic population health-and-longev-
ity profiles just described, although certainly not a standard format for public
8 FULLERTON & ROGERS, supra note 56, at 4-5.
0 Another example of the use of simulation models to estimate policy effects on lifetime
incomes is Jan H.M. Nelissen, Annual Versus Lifetime Income Redistribution by Social Secur-
ity, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 223 (1998). Further examples are discussed id. at 224-25.
"' See generally SUMMARY MEASURES OF POPULATION HEALTH (Christopher J.L. Murray
et al. eds., 2002).
92 See generally sources cited supra note 1.
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health work, is surely feasible with existing tools.93 Microsimulation models
that model lifetime histories of an entire population are already in use, par-
ticularly in evaluating the impacts of tobacco and cancer policy.9 4 For exam-
ple, Tammy Tengs and co-authors estimated the total change in QALYs that
would result over 50 years from federal policy requiring safer cigarettes, by
using the Tobacco Policy Model.
The Tobacco Policy Model is a flexible system dynamics computer
simulation model . . . [that is] designed to calculate the public
health gains or losses from any change in the hazards or patterns
of cigarette use.
To start the present simulation, we initialized the model with
the number of people in the U.S. population in the year 2003. We
divided the population into cohorts according to gender, initial age
. . . and smoking status (current, former, or never smoker) ...
The model then simulates annual transitions such as birth, death,
aging, net migration, and changes in smoking behavior in the U.S.
population over 50 years with transition probabilities varying by
age, gender, smoking status, and year.
In our model, gains or losses in an individual's health are
measured with quality-adjusted-life-years (QALYs). . . . Quality
of life data for current, former, and never smokers of various ages
and genders were obtained from [survey data]. We estimated
mortality hazard functions using mortality data for each gender...
and smoking status .... 95
A bigger challenge for PPPA is integrating the income and health-and-
longevity elements. Imagine that, using a general equilibrium model, we
have generated a baseline probability distribution across population profiles
each consisting of an income history for each of the N individuals in the
population and a perturbation in that distribution occasioned by the policy.
Similarly, using risk assessment techniques and information about popula-
tion health, we have generated a baseline probability distribution across pop-
ulation profiles each consisting of a health-and-longevity history for each of
the N individuals in the population and a perturbation in that distribution
91 See Michael Wolfson & Geoff Rowe, On Measuring Inequalities in Health, 79 BULL.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 553, 557-58 (2001) (describing use of microsimulation modeling to
estimate population health inequality and stating that existing modeling methods are "more
than adequate").
91 On tobacco policy, see, for example, Sajjad Ahmad & John Billimek, Estimating the
Health Impacts of Tobacco Harm Reduction Policies: A Simulation Modeling Approach, 25
RIsK ANAL. 801 (2005); Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Federal Policy Mandating Safer Cigarettes: A
Hypothetical Simulation of the Anticipated Population Health Gains or Losses, 23 J. POL'Y
ANAL. & MGMT. 857 (2004) and sources cited therein. On cancer policy, see David Fone et
al., Systematic Review of the Use and Value of Computer Simulation Modelling in Population
Health and Health Care Delivery, 25 J. PUB. HEALTH MED. 325, 332 (2003).
91 Tengs et al., supra note 94, at 860.
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occasioned by the policy. How do we synthesize this information to produce
the requisite characterization of the status quo and the policy as probability
distributions over profiles that contain information both about each individ-
ual's health/longevity and about her income?
The simplest approach would be to assume that the income and the
health/longevity components of population profiles occur independently. In
other words, the probability of a given combined profile, with information
both about each individual's income and about each individual's health and
longevity, is simply the product of the probabilities of the constituent in-
come profile and health/longevity profile. This approach is very crude, of
course, because morbidity (and mortality!) will change an individual's in-
come. The practice of PPPA might commence using this approach; but cer-
tainly techniques should be developed to incorporate interactions between
morbidity/mortality and income in predicting individual longevity-health-in-
come histories and population profiles of these histories. Existing work on
health equity in the "social gradient" tradition may be helpful here. Much
of this work documents correlations between income and health/longevity96
and could well be helpful in calibrating sophisticated composite life-cycle
models that include both characteristics.
I have discussed techniques for characterizing population profiles with
respect to individual health, longevity and income. Adding information
about measurable social position, such as race and gender, should not pose a
large challenge. Sophisticated models that estimate individual longevity-
health-income histories might already include race and gender as one predic-
tor of these attributes. 97 In any event, there is much existing information
about the correlation of race and gender with income, health and longevity.98
2. The Well-Being Step: Identifying a Utility Function
PPPA requires a utility function U that maps each possible individual
life history L,,k onto a lifetime utility number, thereby converting a popula-
tion profile of life histories Ok = (Lik, L2.k .. LN.k) into a vector of lifetime
utilities (U(LI,k),U(L2 ,).U(LNk)) = (Ulk, U2,k,...,UNk). Where does this util-
ity function come from? Let us place to one side, for the moment, the diffi-
cult and controversial problem of incorporating measurable social position in
" See, e.g., Tony Blakely & Nick Wilson, Shifting Dollars, Saving Lives: What Might
Happen to Mortality Rates, and Socio-Economic Inequalities in Mortality Rates, if Income
Was Redistibuted?, 62 Soc. SCI. MED. 2024, 2024-25 (2006); Braveman, supra note 19, at
169-70, 172; Ulf-G. Gerdtham & Magnus Johannesson, Income-Related Inequality in Life-
Years and Quality-Adjusted Life-Years, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 1007, 1007-08 (2000). See also
Angus Deaton, Health, Inequality, and Economic Development, 41 J. EcON. LIT. 113, 113-14
(2003) (discussing literature concerning connection between income inequality and health).
97 For example, the Tobacco Policy Model described above uses gender as one predictor of
annual transitions. See Tengs et al., supra note 94, at 860.
9' See, e.g., Braveman, supra note 19, at 170-72; Peter Franks et al., The Burden of Dis-
ease Associated with Being African-American in the United States and the Contribution of
Socio-Economic Status, 62 SoC. ScI. & MED. 2469, 2469-70 (2006).
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the determination of utility. Consider the problem of specifying a utility
function that assigns a lifetime utility number to each Lik as a function of its
income, health, and longevity attributes.
The best approach to specifying that function would involve surveys,
where randomly selected members of the general public are placed in a
favorable informational and deliberative state and are asked to rank different
hypothetical longevity-health-income histories, and perhaps lotteries over
these histories, with respect to well-being. Utility numbers, in turn, would
be the numbers (unique up to some transformation) that represent respon-
dents' well-informed preferences over the histories and lotteries. In previous
work, I have discussed the use of utility surveys as a way to generate utility
numbers that could improve the practice of CBA. 99 Here, I propose utility
surveys as a way to generate the numbers that equity analysis would require.
Estimating utilities based on surveys inquiring about lifetime health-
and-income histories is a less utopian enterprise than it may seem. Surveys
are already widely employed to elicit information about individual well-be-
ing that is useful for policy analysis.1°° The three chief examples are "con-
tingent valuation" surveys, which ask individuals about their WTPIWTA
amounts for different policies; happiness surveys, which ask individuals to
quantify their happiness or their satisfaction with their lives; and QALY
surveys, which ask individuals to measure the quality of health states on a
zero-to-one scale. The lifetime-health-and-income survey contemplated here
is roughly analogous to a QALY survey, with two crucial differences. First,
individuals should be asked to rank temporally extended histories rather than
particular health states (which is what the QALY method focuses on). Sec-
ond, individuals should be asked to rank histories that encompass both in-
come and longevity/health.
Neither of these innovations represents a huge step beyond existing sur-
vey formats. As for the first, some survey work has already been done by
public health researchers that departs from the standard QALY format and
inquires about preferences over temporally extended health histories.' 0' As
" See Adler, supra note 78, at 1965-68; Adler, supra note 48, at 53-57, 55 n.184.
"'See generally Adler, supra note 78.
"" See Adler, supra note 48, at 19-20, 47; Aki Tsuchiya & Paul Dolan, The QALY Model
and Individual Preferences for Health States and Health Profiles over Time: A Systematic
Review of the Literature, 25 MED. DECISION MAKING 460 (2005). To be sure, surveys to elicit
respondents' preferences regarding longevity-health-income histories must be designed to be
feasible, given respondents' cognitive limitations. Respondents cannot be asked to evaluate
every possible history. On this score, it should be noted that the proposal of some health
scholars to use a survey format which would value health histories - the "healthy year
equivalent" or "HYE" format - has been criticized as infeasible. See id. at 465-67. How-
ever, it is not clear why using surveys to assign values to temporally extended histories is
qualitatively less feasible than using surveys to value momentary states, which is what the
QALY format does. Just as it is impossible for a cognitively limited respondent to consider all
possible histones, so it is impossible for her to consider all possible momentary states. QALY
survey designers circumvent this difficulty in various ways. For example, they may use stan-
dardized "health state classification systems" to describe health states as a combination of
locations on a discrete number of dimensions, and ask each respondent to value a sample of
the total set of possible states, so as to estimate a function that maps each combination of
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for the second, contingent-valuation surveys that ask about WTP/WTA for
health effects or mortality risks are routinely conducted, 0 2 and these surveys
do require respondents to make tradeoffs between income and health or lon-
gevity. Indeed, the theoretical literature on contingent-valuation surveys
often assumes that respondents answer with reference to a utility function.
In the case of a survey asking about WTPIWTA for health effects, this
means a utility function that takes both health and income as its arguments.
In the case of a survey asking about WTP/WTA for mortality risks, this
means a utility function that is sensitive to the length of time for which a
respondent is alive and can enjoy her income.
What particular survey format should be used to determine the utility
value of longevity-health-income histories? This is a matter for experimen-
tation. One possibility builds on the "standard gamble" format, widely em-
ployed in eliciting QALY valuations. The QALY standard gamble asks the
respondent to identify the indifference probability q, such that she is indif-
ferent between living some given period of time in a health state h, and a
lottery with probability q of living for that period of time in perfect health
and 1-q of dying instantly. Similarly, one might use a lifetime standard
gamble to determine lifetime utilities. Specify a nearly perfect longevity-
health-income history (one hundred years in full health and a high income)
and a perfectly awful one (one hundred years in a health state no better than
death and a subsistence income). For a given life-history Li.k, ask the respon-
dent for the probability u that makes her indifferent between getting the life-
history for sure and a lottery with probability u of the nearly perfect life
history and probability 1-u of the perfectly awful one. Set U(Lik) = u.
The lifetime standard gamble format is theoretically appealing because
a strong case can be made that the utility numbers emerging from this format
would be the correct numbers to use as inputs into the social welfare func-
tion. 103 However, the format might prove cognitively overwhelming, and
other formats should be experimented with. Along with the standard gam-
ble, so-called "time tradeoff' questions are routinely employed in QALY
surveys. Ann Holmes has experimented with the use of time tradeoff ques-
tions to elicit respondent preferences with respect to both health and non-
health characteristics. 104
Another possibility is to constrain the form of the utility function.
Health economists often assume that the utility of health and consumption or
locations along the dimensions to a QALY value. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 48, at 48-50. It
is not clear why similar devices could not be used to elicit valuations of temporally extended
histories.
'02 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 48, at 40-41 n.133 (citing surveys of health-related contin-
gent valuation studies).
1 3 In particular, Harsanyi's account of interpersonal comparisons, which reduces judg-
ments of overall well-being to preferences over lotteries of possible life histories, provides a
theoretical basis for the lifetime standard gamble. See Adler, supra note 48, at 17-24 (present-
ing Harsanyi's account).
" See Ann M. Holmes, A Method to Elicit Utilities for Interpersonal Comparisons, 17
MED. DEciSION MAKING 10 (1997).
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income is additive across periods and multiplicative within periods. 05 In
other words,
T
U(L,k) = Xq(h,)v(y,),
t=1
where individual i lives for T periods in outcome Ok; hi, is her health state in
period t; y,, is her income or consumption in period t; and q(h,,) and v(y,,,)
are "subutility" functions measuring the value of health and income/con-
sumption, respectively, in each period. 06 Bleichrodt and Quiggin have
shown that this functional form follows from a set of preference axioms. 07 I
have argued that U(L,,k) might take a different form. If different axioms are
satisfied, U(L,,k) = Q(H,.k) X V(YK), where H,,k is individual i's lifetime health
history in outcome Ok and Y,k is her lifetime income history. 08 Surveys
might be conducted to test whether the preferences of well-informed individ-
uals regarding longevity-health-income histories tend to satisfy either set of
axioms.' °9 If one axiom set is more or less satisfied, surveys designed to
establish the parameters of the particular functional form U(L,.k) grounded on
that set can then be undertaken. Surveys of this sort would presumably be
less cognitively demanding than lifetime standard gambles. For example, if
T
U(L,.k) = q(h,,)v(y,),
then surveys regarding preferences for hypothetical health-and-income com-
binations during a period (not whole lifetime histories) would be needed to
estimate the q(h,.,) and v(y,,) functions.
The utility function U should, ideally, represent the convergent prefer-
ences of well-informed respondents contemplating hypothetical longevity-
health-income histories. But what if survey respondents diverge in their an-
'05 See James K. Hammitt, How Much is a QALY Worth? Admissible Utility Functions for
Health and Wealth 2 (May 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Environ-
mental Law Review).
"o Strictly, h,, should be h,.,,k and y,., should be Y,,,k, but to avoid unwieldy symbols I have
omitted the "k" subscript.
107 See Han Bleichrodt & John Quiggin, Life-Cycle Preferences over Consumption and
Health: When Is Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Equivalent to Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 18 J.
HEALTH ECON. 681, 683-90 (1999).
108 See Adler, supra note 48, at 25-30. More precisely, U(L,.k) = Q(H,.k) x V(B,.k), where
B,., is the "background" or non-health characteristics of individual i in outcome Ok (such as
income, social position, family relationships, or professional accomplishment). If PPPA ig-
nores background characteristics other than income, then Q(H,,k) x V(B,.) becomes Q(H,8k) x
V(Y,8 ).
109 Cf William N. Evans & W. Kip Viscusi, Estimation of State-Dependent Utility Func-
tions using Survey Data, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 94 (1991) (using contingent-valuation
surveys to estimate the structure of utility as a function of health and income); W. Kip Viscusi
& William N. Evans, Utility Functions that Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic
Implications, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 353 (1990) (same); Beatrice Rey & Jean-Charles Rochet,
Health and Wealth: How Do They Affect Individual Preferences?, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK
& INS. THEORY 43 (2004) (discussing possible test to discriminate between different health-
and-wealth utility functions).
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swers? After all, interrater convergence in the case of existing QALY
surveys is often not very high. 10 This important question raises large issues
about interpersonal comparisons, incommensurability, and the meaning of
utility numbers, which I have grappled with elsewhere and cannot address at
length here. 1 ' A first-cut response is to stress that well conducted surveys
should attempt to debias respondents and provide them with information. If
divergence persists, median or average values should be used, as a reasona-
ble estimate of what respondents under yet more ideal conditions would con-
verge in preferring.
I have suggested that surveys asking respondents about their prefer-
ences over hypothetical longevity-health-income histories would be very
helpful in calibrating the utility function U. But survey data of this sort does
not yet exist. How should PPPA be undertaken in the interim? An initial
possibility is to ignore health in the analysis. The appropriate form of the
utility function in the case where it is conceptualized as a function of income
(or consumption) alone has been discussed at length in various subfields of
economics. A standard assumption is that the utility function has the "con-
stant relative risk aversion" form U(y) = yle/(1-e), or log (y) where e = 1.112
The British government, which now recommends distributive weighting in
CBA, adopted this assumption in deriving recommended weights." 3 The pa-
rameter e can be estimated based on individual behavior as well as surveys,
and substantial work of this sort has been undertaken.' 14 One review of this
literature concludes that policymakers should use a range of 0.7 to 1.5 for
the value of e; 15 another suggests a broader range, namely 0.5 to 4.0.116
110 See, e.g., Paul Dolan et al., The Time Trade-Off Method: Results from a General Popu-
lation Survey, 5 HEALTH ECON. 141, 150 (1996).
. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 48, at 21-22; ADLER & POSNER, supra note 1, at 49-50,
161-62, 161 n.28; Matthew D. Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1371, 1401-08 (1998).
'12 See, e.g., TUOMALA, supra note 76, at 47; Olof Johansson-Stenman, On the Value of
Life in Rich and Poor Countries and Distributional Weights Beyond Utilitarianism, 17 ENVTL.
& RESOURCE EcON. 299, 302-03 (2000); CHRISTIAN GOLLIER, THE ECONOMICS OF RISK AND
TIME 27 (2001).
113 See David J. Evans, The Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption: Estimates for
20 OECD Countries, 26 FISCAL STUDIES 197, 200 (2005).
"4 See Frank A. Cowell & Karen Gardiner, Welfare Weights 25-29 (STICERD, London
School of Economics, 1999); Evans, supra note 113; David Pearce & David Ulph, A Social
Discount Rate for the United Kingdom 9-15 (CSERGE Working Paper GEC 95-01, 1995). See
also Louis Kaplow, The Value of a Statistical Life and the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aver-
sion, 31 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 23 (2005) (discussing high values of e estimated in literature
on "equity premium," and the inconsistency between those values and existing estimates of
the income elasticity of the value of statistical life); Louis R. Eeckhoudt & James K. Hammitt,
Background Risks and the Value of a Statistical Life, 23 J. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 261, 276-
77 (2001) (discussing relation between income elasticity of VSL and coefficient of relative
risk aversion). For an interesting recent study that uses a Harsanyi-style veil of ignorance
format to estimate e, see Olof Johansson-Stenman et al., Measuring Future Grandparents'
Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing, 112 EcON. J. 362 (2002).
..5 Pearce & Ulph, supra note 114, at 14-16. These authors focus on the range of e appro-
priate for policymaking in the United Kingdom.
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Using this constant-relative-risk-aversion function, utility would be assigned
to a life-history as
T TX U(yi,) = Xyi).e/(1-e)
that is, by adding up the individual's income utility in all periods until she
dies.
It should also be possible to employ existing data from health contin-
gent-valuation surveys to estimate the shape of U, particularly if
T
U(L,,k) = q(h,,)v(y,),
t=l
in accordance with the Bleichrodt and Quiggin axioms. The amount of
money that an individual is willing to accept to move from one health state
to a worse state (her WTA for that move), or the amount of money that she is
willing to pay to move from one health state to a better state (her WTP
amount), depends on the marginal utility of income in the two states. From
WTP/WTA data, then, we can estimate the marginal utility of income in
different health states, and thus the shape of the function q(h,.,). By assum-
ing further that the function v(y,,,) is the constant relative risk aversion form
with risk aversion parameter e, we have concrete specifications for both the
q and v functions and can apply these to a given L,,k to calculate U(L,,k).
Viscusi and Evans have undertaken pioneering work that employs WTP/
WTA data to estimate the marginal utility of income in different health
states,1 7 and more work of this kind would be very useful in estimating U
for purposes of PPPA.
Finally, what about social position? Socioeconomic status automati-
cally enters into PPPA, even without separate attention to social position,
since an individual's life-history includes information about her income. In-
sofar as PPPA employs an SWF that is equity-regarding rather than utilita-
rian, or a utility function with diminishing marginal income utility, PPPA
will automatically be sensitive to the distribution of income. It is not, how-
ever, automatically sensitive to the racial or gender characteristics of those
who benefit or are harmed by policies. Should it be?
Incorporating social position as a determinant of individual lifetime
utility - as a separate element of an individual's life-history - is a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, this adjustment means that low-status indi-
viduals have stronger redistributive claims. Redistributing a unit of lifetime
utility from a high- to a low-status individual with identical income, longev-
ity, and health characteristics increases the value of an equity-regarding
"6 Cowell & Gardiner, supra note 114, at 33. See also Johansson-Stenman et al., supra
note 114, at 363 (noting that "values in the interval 0.5-2 [for relative risk aversion] are often
referred to").
H7 See Viscusi & Evans, supra note 109, at 363-67. See also Frank A. Sloan et al., Alter-
native Approaches to Valuing Intangible Health Losses: The Evidence for Multiple Sclerosis,
17 J. HEALTH ECON. 475, 478, 489-90 (1998).
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SWF, but would not do so if social position were ignored. On the other
hand, incorporating social position may mean that income, longevity, and
health have greater marginal utility when possessed by high-status rather
than low-status individuals. Imagine that lifetime utility is of the form
T
s1 q(h,t)v(y,.,),
where s, is a positive number that measures status, increasing as status in-
creases. Then a given increment in health or income in some period has a
greater effect on lifetime utility for a high-status individual, as does a given
extension of longevity. A utilitarian SWF would, therefore, end up shifting
health, longevity, and income to higher-status individuals. An equity-re-
garding SWF could also do so, depending on how it balanced distributive
considerations with overall well-being. Further, the degree to which race
and gender currently correspond to lower-status social positions is a compli-
cated and controversial question.
For these reasons, incorporating social position as a separate determi-
nant of individual lifetime utility will be politically controversial, and agen-
cies (and even academics) undertaking PPPA may hesitate to do so.
Bracketing political constraints, social position should be incorporated in life
histories as a separate determinant of individual lifetime utility. The double-
edged impact of social position on welfarist analysis, described in the pre-
ceding paragraph, does not - to my mind - show the contrary." 8 But the
best is the enemy of the good, and it is certainly possible to structure PPPA
so that race and gender information is (1) wholly ignored, or (2) employed
only at the predictive stage, to improve estimates of the probability of differ-
ent population profiles, which are described as combinations of individual
longevity-health-income histories rather than individual longevity-health-in-
come-social position histories.
3. The Social Welfare Step: Identifying an SWF
The final step of PPPA is applying an equity-regarding SWF, or family
of SWFs, to the probabilistic population profile in the status quo and result-
ing from each policy. This may seem like a hopeless task. There are count-
less functions from utility vectors to social welfare numbers that satisfy the
Pigou-Dalton principle and therefore count as equity-regarding. How does
the PPPA analyst know which one(s) to use?
This problem is more tractable than it may seem at first glance. The
academic scholarship that has actually employed SWFs to study concrete
"s As already mentioned, Ann Holmes has conducted surveys where respondents are
asked to value hypothetical lives described both in terms of health and in terms of other char-
acteristics. The additional characteristics include gender. See Holmes, supra note 104.
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policy questions often uses the so-called Atkinsonian family of SWFs.1"9
This family has the form
N
W(U,U 2 ..... UN) = XUil l-y),1=I
where y is the so-called inequality-aversion parameter and y > 0, y 1.
N
(Where y = 1, W(UI,U 2,...,U) = log(U)).120
The set of SWFs comprised of SWFs within the Atkinsonian family and
increasing transforms thereof' 2' are the only SWFs that satisfy two plausible
axioms in addition to the basic Pigou-Dalton axiom: separability and ratio-
rescaling-invariance. 22 Separability means that the particular utility level of
119 See TUOMALA, supra note 76, at 28-29; Johansson-Stenman, supra note 112, at 302-03;
Samuel Fankhauser et al., The Aggregation of Climate Change Damages: A Welfare Theoretic
Approach, 10 EVNTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 249, 257 (1997). In some of this literature, the
social welfare function is an Atkinsonian function that takes individual incomes rather than
utilities as its arguments. See Parry et al., supra note 57, at 26-28; Louis Kaplow, Concavity of
Utility, Concavity of Welfare, and Redistribution of Income 2 (Harvard L. Sch. Discussion
Paper No. 437, 2003). Atkinsonian SWFs are also used in the health economics literature that
discusses applying SWFs to QALYs. See sources cited supra note 51.
120 See, e.g., BOJER, supra note 38, at 110. The formula for the Atkinsonian SWF is
sometimes multiplied by IIN, where N is the population size. Where N is the same in all
outcomes - as assumed throughout this Article, see supra text accompanying note 84 - that
formula is equivalent to the one given in the text, both in its ranking of utility vectors and in its
ranking of policies. In the case where y = 1, the formula for the Atkinsonian SWF is
sometimes given as the product of individuals' utilities rather than the sum of the logarithms of
utilities. These formulations are increasing transformations of each other (see, e.g.,
Fankhauser, supra note 119, at 257-58) and therefore order utility vectors (but not necessarily
policies) the same way. See infra note 121.
121 Take an Atkinsonian SWF
N
W(U,, U2,...,UN) - , U,"(1-y),
with y specified. Consider W*, which is an increasing transformation of W. (In other words,
W(U,U2,...,UN) = g(W(U,U2,...,UN)), where g is what's known as an "increasing" or "mono-
tonically increasing" function, which means that the graph of g always slopes up). Because
W* is an increasing transformation of W, W* and W order utility vectors the same way. How-
ever, W* and W applied in an ex post fashion to policies (probability distributions over utility
vectors) may not order these policies the same way. This raises the difficult question, which I
cannot address here, about how one identifies the appropriate transformation to use in PPPA,
once one has specified y. That identification involves determining the degree to which policy-
makers should be risk averse in social welfare. As an initial matter, I suggest, PPPA should
assume risk-neutrality in social welfare, i.e., simply use the Atkinsonian SWF itself rather than
some nonlinear transformation. But the issue certainly deserves more exploration.
122 See LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 94-102; Anthony Atkinson, On the Measurement of
Inequality, 2 J. ECON. THEORY 244, 244-45, 249-52 (1970). It is important to note that the
Atkinsonian family of SWFs is not attractive if individuals' lifetime utilities can be negative.
With negative utilities, the function U,'-Y(l-y) is either undefined or, if defined, is either de-
creasing or strictly convex. Therefore, the SWF will not satisfy both the Pareto principle and
the Pigou-Dalton principle. Identifying an appropriate SWF that can allow for negative utili-
ties is a difficult task that I will not attempt to resolve here. See Campbell Brown, Matters of
Priority 192-197 (Mar. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The Australian National University)
(on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (proving that no SWF has the pri-
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an individual who has the same utility in two outcomes being compared is
irrelevant to the SWF's rankings of those outcomes. This axiom is a formal
expression of the philosophical position known as "prioritarianism," which
many philosophers of equality now adopt. 123 Ratio-rescaling-invariance
means that the ranking of utility vectors should not change if we multiply all
utilities by a common positive constant. In other words, if W assigns a
greater value to (UI,U 2, . . . UN) than to (U,*,U 2*, .... UN*), then it must
assign a greater value to (kUI, kU 2, . . . , kU) than to (kUl*, kU2*, ....
kUN*). Ratio-rescaling-invariance is very plausible, since welfarist theory
currently provides no basis for thinking that there are genuine, measurable,
and morally significant aspects of individual well-being which are captured
by some vector of utility numbers representing a given outcome but lost if
we multiply everyone's utility by a common positive constant. 24
To be sure, the Atkinsonian SWFs are an entire family of SWFs,
parameterized by the inequality-aversion parameter y. At one extreme, with
y = 0, the Atkinsonian SWF becomes the utilitarian SWF. At the other
extreme, with y = -, the Atkinsonian SWF becomes the "leximin" social
ordering, which gives absolute priority to improving the well-being of
worse-off individuals.2 5 So which value of y should be used?
oritarian form of summing an increasing, strictly concave function of individual utilities and
has an unrestricted domain and is invariant to a ratio transformation); Amartya Sen, Social
Choice Theory, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 1073, 1127 & n.74 (Kenneth
J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds., 1986). As for utility vectors that include zeros, the
Atkinsonian SWF will be defined only for y < I.
123 See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 43, at 300-02.
214 Harsanyi-style utility numbers, the expectations of which represent well-informed indi-
viduals' convergent preferences over lotteries of life histories, will be unique up to an affine
transformation. It is a well-known feature of such "von-Neumann/Morgenstem" utilities,
meant to represent decisions under risk or uncertainty, that they are unique up to an affine
transformation. In other words, given a utility function U which maps life histories onto utili-
ties, such that the expected utility numbers calculated using these utilities accurately represent
a well-informed individual's preferences over lotteries of those histories, we can multiply U by
a positive constant c and add a constant d. Expectations with respect to these new utilities will
produce the very same ordering of lotteries as expectations with respect to the original utilities.
By taking a morally significant zero point - for example, a life no better than nonexistence
- and giving it a utility of zero, we can narrow down the set of admissible utility functions.
Consider a function U* that represents the well-informed individual's ordering of lotteries and
assigns a value of zero to the zero point. Any admissible function will have to be produced by
taking U* and multiplying it by a positive constant. However, that transformation remains
admissible. Any new function produced by multiplying U* by a positive constant will still
assign zero to the zero point, and expectations formed with respect to this new function will
still order lotteries of life histories correctly.
To preclude multiplying utilities assigned to life histories by a positive constant, we would
need to have morally significant information beyond (1) well-informed individuals' (conver-
gent) ordering of life histories and lotteries of life histories, and (2) their (convergent) identifi-
cation of the zero point. It is hard to see what that information would be.
125 See, e.g., LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 99-102; Kristof Bosmans, Extreme Inequality
Aversion Without Separability, 32 ECON. THEORY 589, 592 (2007).
HeinOnline  -- 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 42 2008
Adler, Risk Equity: A New Proposal
A first cut at this problem is to use the entire range of values of y.126
This might be illuminating. Larger values of y translate into a stronger so-
cial preference for equality.'27 If PPPA using the Atkinsonian family prefers
one policy to another for all values of y, or for all values below a high value
of y, or for all values above a low value of y, then the first policy is probably
the best policy, all things considered. Conversely, if PPPA's ranking of the
two policies is sensitive to the choice of y, then the case for one or the other
policy is unclear.
A second cut at this problem is to isolate some range of values of y as
particularly plausible through normative analysis, surveys, or reverse engi-
neering. A given value of y has policy implications. Normative analysis, in
the standard reflective equilibrium mode, means making these policy impli-
cations explicit and deciding whether the analyst finds them intuitively ac-
ceptable or unacceptable. Atkinson long ago suggested a "leaky bucket"
thought experiment for specifying a social welfare function,'28 and a number
of other authors have since seconded his suggestion. 29 Leaky-bucket
thought experiments have different variants, 30 the simplest being as follows.
Imagine that one individual h is at well-being level Uh, and a second, less
well-off individual 1 is at well-being level U1. A policy reduces the first
individual's well-being by a small amount, u, and improves the second's by
du, with d less than or equal to 1. If d is equal to 1, then anyone but the
utilitarian will count the policy as an improvement. Imagine decreasing the
value of d from 1. At what value of d do you think that the policy and the
status quo are equally good? Your answer fixes a value of y.
A different sort of thought experiment asks about sacrifices to overall
well-being for the sake of equalizing well-being.'' Specify an unequal pop-
ulation distribution of well-being, (U .... UN), and identify the level of
126 See Fankhauser et al., supra note 119, at 257-59. Many studies use a smaller range of
values of y, often in the context of an SWF that takes incomes rather than utilities as its
arguments. See LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 129; Parry, supra note 57, at 28.
127 For any unequal distribution of utilities, there is an amount U+ of utility which, if
equally distributed, has the same social welfare value as the unequal distribution. That
amount, U+ , is lower the greater the value of y. Also, for a given pair of individuals at utility
levels High and Low, the ratio between the marginal social value of Low's utility and High's
utility increases with y.
28 See Yoram Amiel et al., Measuring Attitudes Towards Inequality, 101 SCANDINAVIAN
J. EcON. 83, 86-88 (1999) (discussing Atkinson's proposal).
129 See, e.g., Cowell & Gardiner, supra note 114, at 15-16; Pearce & Ulph, supra note
114, at 14-15; Stem, supra note 76, at 47-48. A closely related kind of question asks about the
choice between benefiting some individual by a certain amount and a better-off individual by a
greater amount. See Dolan, supra note 51, at 51-52.
'30 Other variants could specify the two individuals' health, income and longevity posi-
tions and ask about leaky transfers of health, income or longevity. Given a utility function
from longevity-health-income histories to utility, answers to these sorts of question will also
fix or help fix a y.
13' See, e.g., Lindholm & Rosen, supra note 51; Williams, supra note 51.
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well-being U+ such that the initial distribution and the distribution (U, U',
. .. , U) are equally good. The level U + fixes a value for y.13 2
Normative analysis to specify a value of y is no more "indeterminate"
or "subjective" than normative philosophical scholarship generally, and
should be undertaken by scholars, whether philosophers or welfare econo-
mists. A different tack is to conduct a "policy survey" - in effect, to invite
the public to engage in normative analysis. "Policy surveys" invite respon-
dents to evaluate policies, not from the stand-point of their own well-being,
but from a more disinterested perspective.'33 Much survey work of this sort
has been undertaken, including surveys about health and risk policy. 3 4
Some economists have in fact used policy surveys to estimate the degree of
inequality-aversion of an Atkinsonian SWF: Amiel asks a leaky-bucket
question, Lindholm an equalization question." 5
Finally, "reverse engineering" the value of y means establishing that
value implied by existing policies - for example, existing tax-and-transfer
policies.36
Although the case for limiting PPPA analysis to Atkinsonian SWFs
should be very persuasive to those who hold a "prioritarian" understanding
of equality - who accept the separability axiom - it will be less persuasive
to non-prioritarians. The debate between prioritarians and nonprioritarians
continues apace in the philosophical literature, with no clear winner.3 7 Ide-
ally, then, SWF analysis should test policies using both Atkinsonian SWFs
and a plausible nonprioritarian SWF. One appealing possibility is to use the
rank-weighted SWF. Take a utility vector (Ul, .. UN). Set W equal to a sum
consisting of N times the smallest utility in this vector, plus (N-i) times the
next-smallest utility, plus (N-2) times the third-smallest utility, and so forth,
up to 1 times the largest utility. This rank-weighted SWF satisfies the
Pigou-Dalton principle, is ratio-rescaling-invariant, and (as it happens) gen-
132 It should be stressed that leaky-bucket and equalization thought experiments are only
two particularly straightforward forms of normative reflection about the value of y. Any anal-
ysis of the implications of a given y for some principle that the analyst endorses, or some
scenario about which the analyst has intuitions, could be helpful in specifying y. See, e.g.,
Fankhauser et al., supra note 119, at 259-62 (identifying values of y consistent with use of
uniform per-unit global warming damages).
133 On the distinction between policy surveys and welfare polls, see Adler, supra note 78.
134 See, e.g., Paul Dolan et al., QALY Maximisation and People's Preferences: A Method-
ological Review of the Literature, 14 HEALTH ECON. 197 (2005).
'35 See Amiel et al., supra note 128, at 86; Lindholm & Rosen, supra note 51. For related
survey work, see Ignacio Abasolo & Aki Tsuchiya, Exploring Social Welfare Functions and
Violation of Monotonicity: An Example from Inequalities in Health, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 313
(2004); Louis Gevers et al., Professed Inequality Aversion and its Error Component, 81 SCAN-
DINAVIAN J. EcON. 238 (1979); Herbert Glejser et al., An Econometric Study of the Variables
Determining Inequality Aversion Among Students, 10 EUR. ECON. REV. 173 (1977); Magnus
Johannesson & Ulf-G. Gerdtham, A Note on the Estimation of the Equity-Efficiency Trade-off
for QALYs, 15 J. HEALTH ECON. 359 (1996); Magnus Johannesson & Ulf-G. Gerdtham, A Pilot
Test of Using the Veil of Ignorance Approach to Estimate a Social Welfare Function for In-
come, 2 APPLIED EcON. LETr. 400 (1995).
136 See LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 129; Cowell & Gardiner, supra note 114, at 24-25.
'.37 See Adler & Sanchirco, supra note 43, at 296-302.
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erates the Gini coefficient as the corresponding measure of inequality,'38 but
it does not satisfy the separability principle. A utility transfer from a high-
utility to a low-utility individual increases social value (thus the Pigou-Dal-
ton principle is satisfied); but the size of the increase depends on the ranks of
the two individuals in the whole population distribution, not their utility
levels taken alone.
C. PPPA, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Equality Measurement
PPPA produces an integrated assessment of policies, sensitive to both
overall well-being and equity. Equity-regarding SWFs such as the Atkin-
sonian SWFs or the rank-weighted SWF are sensitive to equity because they
satisfy the Pigou-Dalton axiom. 3 9 At the same time, they are sensitive to
overall well-being in that (1) Pareto superior outcomes are always pre-
ferred 40 and more generally (2) holding constant the degree of inequality, an
equity-regarding SWF will prefer the outcome with greater total utility."
4
These observations raise the question of how PPPA relates to cost-bene-
fit analysis (CBA), on the one hand, and inequality measurement, on the
other. Eric Posner and I have defended CBA as a proxy for overall well-
being. 42 PPPA is more flexible than CBA. PPPA can yield a verdict about
overall well-being, by inserting a utilitarian SWF into the format. Yet, as
just explained, PPPA (unlike CBA) can yield a judgment about whether the
policy is better than the status quo on balance, given both overall-well-being
and equity concerns. This occurs automatically when PPPA employs an eq-
uity-regarding rather than utilitarian SWF.
"' See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 43, at 302. Actually, there are many different
variations on the simple rank-weighted SWF described in the text. Consider any SWF which
ranks utilities from lowest to highest, multiplies each by a positive weight which is a decreas-
ing function of rank, and sums the weighted utilities. Any such SWF will be ratio-rescaling-
invariant, satisfy the Pareto principle, and satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle. So an equity
analyst who is conducting a particularly full PPPA analysis might want to consider evaluating
policies using different rank-weighted SWFs within this general family. See generally BLACK-
ORBY ET AL., supra note 84, at 75-82, 99-100 (discussing rank-weighted family of SWFs).
39 See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
4 Although it is possible to have "non-Paretian" SWFs - SWFs that sometimes fail to
prefer a Pareto-superior outcome - the case for the Pareto principle is powerful, and it is
certainly possible for SWFs to both satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle and be Paretian. In
particular, Atkinsonian SWFs and the rank-weighted SWF have both characteristics See Adler
& Sanchirico, supra note 43, at 291-304; BLACKORBY ET AL., supra note 84, at 69-82.
14 1 The ordering of outcomes produced by a given equity-regarding SWF W is the same as
that produced by assigning each utility vector a number equaling
N N
I U)(1-Mw(U.,U2,,UN)), where I U,
is total utility and Mw is an inequality measure generated by the SWF. See Marc Fleurbaey,
Equality versus Priority: How Relevant is the Distinction?, in FAIRNESS AND GOODNESS IN
HEALTH (Daniel Wikler et al. eds., World Health Organization) (forthcoming). Holding con-
stant the degree of inequality, i.e., the value of M , outcomes with greater total utility are
preferred.
.42 See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 1.
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At some point PPPA might displace CBA. But that is not the proposal
here. CBA is widely employed by agencies, and its techniques are now
highly developed. PPPA is novel and untested. My proposal, therefore, is
that agencies and policy analysts employ PPPA in conjunction with CBA. If
both CBA and PPPA favor one policy over a second, then the case for the
first policy is strong. If CBA favors the first policy but PPPA favors the
second, then it would appear that overall well-being favors the first policy
but that the overall balance of moral considerations - overall well-being
plus equity - favors the second. The case for the first policy is weaker; the
case for the second policy is stronger, although not yet necessarily clear,
because PPPA itself is an experimental procedure. In this event, it may be
appropriate for the agency to undertake a more intensive CBA or PPPA, or
perhaps to elicit guidance from Congress or the President.
What about the connection between PPPA and inequality measurement?
PPPA yields an integrated assessment of policies, but agencies may find it
useful to ascertain how policies compare purely as a matter of equality.
PPPA readily yields that sort of evaluation. Economists of inequality have
developed the important insight that any equity-regarding SWF generates a
corresponding inequality metric. For a given social welfare function W,
there is a corresponding inequality metric Mw, which ranges from zero (no
inequality) to 1 (maximal inequality), defined as follows. For any utility
vector (U1, U2 ... , UN), identify U+ such that W(U, U2, . . . UN) = W(U + ,
U+, .... U+). In other words, a perfectly equal outcome in which every
individual receives the same amount of utility, U , has the same W-value as
the initial vector. Then
NMW (UI, U2 . .. UN) =  1 N U+/ l U .
The denominator of the
N
NU+/ YX U,
fraction is the total well-being associated with the initial vector; the numera-
tor is the amount of total well-being which, if equally distributed, would
have the same W-value as the initial vector. The smaller this fraction is, the
larger the fraction of the total well-being associated with the initial vector
that could be lost in an equalizing redistribution while still holding social
welfare constant, and thus the larger the degree of inequality.1 43
With this insight, PPPA can be straightforwardly adapted to provide a
judgment about the change in expected inequality produced by a policy. The
status quo is a probability distribution across lifetime utility vectors; the pol-
icy is a different distribution. For each possible status quo vector, we deter-
mine its inequality as measured by MW. The expected status quo inequality
143 See, e.g., LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 94-102; SEN, supra note 38, at 38-39; BOJER,
supra note 38, at 108-11; Cowell, supra note 38, at 113-15.
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is simply the sum of each vector's inequality, discounted by its probability.
The same series of calculations yields the expected degree of inequality for
the policy.
CONCLUSION
This Article presents a novel approach to considering the equity im-
pacts of risk regulation policies. This approach, "probabilistic population
profile analysis" (PPPA), is rooted in the SWF view of social choice -
specifically, in a particular version of the SWF approach for which I have
provided a full philosophical defense elsewhere, one that focuses on lifetime
well-being and that adopts an ex post rather than ex ante view of choice
under uncertainty. From this perspective, PPPA is a large improvement on
existing approaches to risk equity, described in Part I. PPPA adopts a popu-
lation-wide approach to equity, unlike the social gradient view adopted by
environmental justice scholars. It attends to the impact of both income and
health/longevity on individuals' (lifetime) well-being. (By contrast, "indi-
vidual risk" tests focus solely on longevity; QALY analysis handles income
impacts imperfectly; and incidence analysis handles health/longevity im-
pacts imperfectly.) PPPA addresses uncertainty in an ex post manner, unlike
"individual risk" tests or CBA using the VSL method. And PPPA is sensi-
tive to both overall well-being and the distribution of well-being, unlike ine-
quality metrics or incidence analysis (or, for that matter, "individual risk"
tests or the disparate-impact tests employed in the environmental justice
literature).
Nor is PPPA a utopian project. The SWF approach has already been
employed to study tax policies and, in a few cases, environmental policies.
Part II describes in detail how PPPA would be implemented. It discusses
both the information that would be needed to bring the approach to full frui-
tion (such as surveys to calibrate utility functions, and more survey work to
calibrate the SWF), as well as the steps that policymakers can take in the
interim.
Only utilitarians believe that policy choice should be solely a function
of overall well-being. Only utilitarians, then, should be comfortable with the
current state of policy analysis, as practiced by governmental agencies and
supported by the existing scholarly literature. Cost-benefit analysis, which
is a workable measure of overall well-being,144 is now very highly developed
and widely employed by agencies. Equity analysis garners much less schol-
arly attention and is rarely used in government. We need to develop imple-
mentable and philosophically well-grounded tools for evaluating the equity
impacts of policies. PPPA is one such tool and, I believe, a particularly
promising one.
" See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 1.
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